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  • Leopold’s Software Glitch Porter &#38 · Co.
    Issue#147, Volume#3He Thought AI Would Eat These Application – But He Had It Backwards Inside Today’s Issue Essay: Leopold’s Software Glitch Leopold Tops This List All Presidents Run Up Debt All-In On Tech Stocks Chart Of The Day… uniQure (QURE) Editor’s note: Today, Porter delivers part two of a three-part series on the implosion of Leopold Aschenbrenner’s Situational Awareness fund – and the key reason behind its failure that everyone seems to be missing… The final installment of this th
     

Leopold’s Software Glitch

26 August 2026 at 13:00

Issue#147, Volume#3

He Thought AI Would Eat These Application – But He Had It Backwards

Inside Today’s Issue

  • Essay: Leopold’s Software Glitch
  • Leopold Tops This List
  • All Presidents Run Up Debt
  • All-In On Tech Stocks
  • Chart Of The Day… uniQure (QURE)


Editor’s note: Today, Porter delivers part two of a three-part series on the implosion of Leopold Aschenbrenner’s Situational Awareness fund – and the key reason behind its failure that everyone seems to be missing… The final installment of this three-part series will appear in the next Journal, on Friday.

Also note this brief update to Monday’s essay, when we reported that Intuit (INTU) was a stock that Leopold Aschenbrenner’s Situational Awareness fund had shorted. Yesterday, Intuit reported fiscal Q4 results and guided fiscal 2027 non-GAAP earnings to $22.88–$23.12 per share against a Wall Street consensus of $27.31. Some people on Wall Street believe (like Leopold) that this is more evidence of the “death of software.” We disagree.

What actually happened is far more banal: effective August 1, Intuit stopped stripping out share-based compensation from these adjusted numbers. CFO Sandeep Aujla said the 2027 guidance carries a $5.81 impact from stock-based compensation expenses. Ergo, when you add $5.81 back, the guidance midpoint is $28.81 per share, 5% above the $27.31 estimate.

Here’s another way to look at it. Intuit’s GAAP accounting requires no reconstruction. Aujla guided fiscal 2027 GAAP earnings per share to $20.12-$20.36, (growth of 22%-24%) against a $19.94 consensus. Those are not the numbers of a dying business.

Fiscal 2026 revenue grew 14% to $21.4 billion. Non-GAAP operating margin expanded 1.5 points to 41.7%. Q4 adjusted earnings came in at $4.03 per share against a $3.58 estimate. Mid-market revenue grew 39% with customers up 28%, and Intuit Enterprise Suite – the accounting and payroll package sold to companies too large for QuickBooks Online – passed $145 million in annualized revenue, 4x the prior year.


Microsoft (MSFT) passed 30 million paid Copilot seats in the June quarter, up from 15 million in January. Tech wizards like Leo Aschenbrenner hate Copilot – Microsoft’s artificial intelligence (“AI”) assistant. Just like they hated Windows ’97. And everything else Microsoft has ever built.

So what?

Accenture alone bought 740,000 Copilot seats. Bayer, Johnson & Johnson, Mercedes-Benz, and Roche have each deployed more than 90,000. Microsoft’s commercial remaining performance obligation – contracted revenue not yet recognized, which is the closest thing software has to a railroad’s signed freight contracts – stands at $678 billion, up 84% year over year!

Annual recurring revenue for Adobe’s (ADBE) AI-first passed $500 million in the quarter ended May 2026 and tripled year over year. Salesforce’s (CRM) Agentforce went from $800 million of annual recurring revenue in the January quarter to $1.2 billion by April, up 205%. Veeva Systems (VEEV) is giving its AI agents away free inside Vault CRM through 2030, which is the single most revealing data point in the set: Veeva does not need to monetize AI, because Veeva’s moat is the validated record, not the intelligence applied to it.

Aschenbrenner thought AI would eat the applications. Instead, the applications are selling AI as an upsell on top of a subscription the customer cannot afford to cancel – because it costs nothing compared to the value it delivers.

These software companies are computing tollbooths: they’re what enterprises pay to implement compute. And as compute gets cheaper, they will generate vastly more revenue, not less. The proof is sitting there in their earnings and cash flow: they’re riding on lower and lower cost of compute, which makes their business more and more efficient.

  • Adobe: 36.6% operating margin, 35.6% return on invested capital (“ROIC”), capital expenditure of $179 million on $23.8 billion of revenue – 0.75% – and $9.85 billion of free cash flow (“FCF”)
  • Veeva: 28.7% operating margin, 68.5% ROIC, a 44.3% FCF margin, and effectively no capex at all
  • Salesforce: $41.5 billion of revenue, roughly $14.4 billion of FCF, capex of about 1.4% of revenue, and $72.4 billion of contracted backlog
  • Intuit (INTU): $18.8 billion of revenue, roughly $6.1 billion of FCF, $124 million of capex

Veeva earns 68 cents a year on the dollar. And invests nothing in growing its business.

Adobe currently trades at about 11x trailing earnings. Salesforce at about 13x. Intuit at about 14x. These are the multiples of a dying industry applied to businesses converting a third to nearly half of every revenue dollar into free cash.

This enormous mispricing was manufactured by people who, like Aschenbrenner, believed these businesses were doomed. But they aren’t.

And that’s not all.

Aschenbrenner assumed that because a technology is transformative, the capital that builds it will earn its cost.

There is no relationship between those two things. In fact, it’s more likely not to be true.

Leo’s own essay contains the tell:

Over the past year, the talk of the town has shifted from $10 billion compute clusters to $100 billion clusters to trillion-dollar clusters. Every six months another zero is added to the boardroom plans.

He wrote that as a bull case. But it isn’t. That is a recipe for a financial disaster.

  • Amazon (AMZN) spent $131.8 billion of capex in 2025 against $139.5 billion of operating cash flow. That is 94.5% of everything the business generated poured back into the ground, in a single year. Its 2026 capex guidance is $220 billion.
  • Alphabet (GOOGL) spent $91.4 billion in 2025, 55.5% of operating cash flow, and guides to $195 billion to $205 billion this year
  • Meta Platforms (META) spent $72.2 billion, 62.4% of operating cash flow, and guides to $125 billion to $145 billion
  • Microsoft spent $115.9 billion in the fiscal year that just ended, against $182.9 billion of operating cash flow. Capex was 34.9% of revenue, up from 18.1% two years earlier. FCF fell to $67.0 billion from $74.1 billion in fiscal 2024, on revenue that grew by more than a third over the same span. Microsoft is running harder and generating less cash. That is what a huge capital cycle does even to the best business in the world.
  • Moody’s (MCO) projects hyperscaler capex of $785 billion in 2026 and close to $1 trillion in 2027, funded in part by roughly $175 billion of debt issuance this year. Where will the money come from?
  • Oracle (ORCL) had fiscal 2026 capex of $55.7 billion, FCF of negative $23.7 billion, capex at 82.6% of revenue, long-term debt up from $76.3 billion to $124.7 billion, and $248 billion of future data-center lease obligations not yet on the balance sheet
  • CoreWeave (CRWV) had $5.13 billion of 2025 revenue, $14.9 billion of capex, negative $7.25 billion of FCF, net debt at 8.1x EBITDA, term loans at 11% to 15%, a weighted-average short-term borrowing rate of 12.3%, and a $1 billion private placement in April 2026 at 9.75%.

Meta’s Hyperion campus in Louisiana is financed through a special purpose vehicle in which Blue Owl Capital (OWL) holds 80% and Meta holds 20%, funded by $27.294 billion of senior secured notes at a 6.581% coupon maturing in 2049. The noteholders have no pledge on the physical data center. Their credit is Meta’s promise to pay rent starting in 2029, plus a residual value guarantee – that’s $27 billion of debt, secured by a lease, sitting off the balance sheet.

And like the EU’s finance minister explained two decades ago…

When it gets serious, you have to lie.

Microsoft extended server useful lives from three years to four, then to six, adding about $3.7 billion to fiscal 2023 operating income. Alphabet did the same, adding about $3.0 billion. Amazon added about $2.5 billion in 2024. Meta added $2.59 billion in 2025. Oracle added $573 million. Every one of those is a non-cash increase in reported profit produced by an assumption about how long a chip stays useful.

It’s a lie.

But not everyone is lying. Effective January 1, 2025, Amazon shortened the useful life of a subset of its servers and networking equipment from six years back to five, citing, in its own 10-K, “the increased pace of technology development, particularly in the area of artificial intelligence and machine learning.” That cost it $1.4 billion of additional depreciation and $1.0 billion of net income.

Amazon is the operator with the longest and hardest-won experience running data centers at scale, and Amazon is the one telling you the hardware wears out faster than the schedules assume.

Tell me what you think of today’s Daily Journal: porterstansberrydirect@gmail.com

Good investing,

F. Porter Stansberry
Stevenson, Maryland

Presented By: The Golden Portfolio


3 Things To Know Before We Go…

1. Leopold Aschenbrenner now sits atop the all-time list of trading losses. The Financial Times ranked the 25 largest trading losses in history. Situational Awareness – the AI-focused hedge fund featured above – takes first place with a $35 billion loss in July, roughly 2.5x the next name on the list, Morgan Stanley’s 2007 subprime mortgage blowup. Archegos, Long-Term Capital Management, and JPMorgan’s “London Whale” all rank further down. The fund held $45 billion at the start of July and about $10 billion by the end, after margin calls – lenders demanding more collateral against borrowed money – forced it to sell its entire public stock portfolio to Ken Griffin’s Citadel at below-market prices.

2. Different presidents, same printing press. M2 money supply has grown from $1.6 trillion at the end of President Jimmy Carter’s term to $23.2 trillion today – a 14x increase across nine administrations of both parties. National debt tells the same story: $1.2 trillion to $39.9 trillion, with $3.7 trillion added in just the first 19 months of the current term. Hard assets like gold, energy, and irreplaceable infrastructure are insurance against the one trend Washington has never broken.

3. A record year for technology stocks. Rampant enthusiasm for the AI revolution has sparked a record year of fund inflows into technology stocks. So far this year, investors are on track to pour a record $216 billion into technology funds, blowing away all previous records by over $100 billion. This has now become one of Wall Street’s most crowded trades.


Chart Of The Day… uniQure (QURE)

Shares of biotech firm uniQure (QURE) have risen more than 100% since being recommended in Porter & Co. Biotechnology for a second time in January – Porter will release his second report since revamping the newsletter on September 5.


Please note: The investments in our “Porter & Co. Top Positions” should not be considered current recommendations. These positions are the best performers across our publications – and the securities listed may (or may not) be above the current buy-up-to price. To learn more, visit the current recommendations page of the relevant service, here| New Window. To gain access or to learn more about our current recommendations, call our Customer Care team at 888-610-8895 or internationally at +1 443-815-4447.

The post Leopold’s Software Glitch appeared first on Porter & Co..

  • ✇Porter & Co
  • Leopold Was Wrong Porter &#38 · Co.
    Issue#146, Volume#3 His 4-To-1 Leverage Just Made His Convictions Worse Inside Today’s Issue Essay: Leopold Was Wrong GenZ “Invests” In Sports Consumers Tap Out Uncle Sam Keeps Spending Chart Of The Day… BWX Technologies (BWXT) Editor’s note: Today, Porter begins part one of a three-part series on the implosion of Leopold Aschenbrenner’s Situational Awareness fund – and the key reason behind its failure that everyone seems to be missing… We will publish the next Journal this week on Wedne
     

Leopold Was Wrong

24 August 2026 at 13:00

Issue#146, Volume#3

His 4-To-1 Leverage Just Made His Convictions Worse


Editor’s note: Today, Porter begins part one of a three-part series on the implosion of Leopold Aschenbrenner’s Situational Awareness fund – and the key reason behind its failure that everyone seems to be missing… We will publish the next Journal this week on Wednesday.


Leopold Aschenbrenner lost $30 billion (67%) in a month.

The consensus post-mortem – from The Wall Street Journal to comments on X – is that the young man who ran the Situational Awareness fund used 4-to-1 leverage on concentrated positions and got carried out. While that is true, it does not convey any useful information. Leverage is certainly the reason Leopold lost so much, so quickly. But it is not the reason he lost. Leverage is merely a magnifying glass. It doesn’t pass judgment.

The reason his fund was doomed was because he’s wrong. And no one, anywhere, has explained why Leopold Aschenbrenner was wrong.

On the morning of Thursday, July 30, before the opening bell, Aschenbrenner’s Situational Awareness sold its entire public stock portfolio – the long side and the short side together, roughly $16 billion of it – to Ken Griffin’s Citadel in a single block trade.

That night, Aschenbrenner wrote to his limited partners. Net performance for the month, unaudited: down 67%. Net performance for the year: still up 80%.

We let you down this month. We came closer to permanent capital impairment than is acceptable to us.

Six days earlier, on July 24, he had written a different letter. That one reported a 439% net return for the first half of 2026, described the selloff in artificial intelligence (“AI”) stocks as one of the best buying opportunities since early 2025, and invited his investors to wire more money starting August 1. It closed with a postscript:

At times we call out opportunities that seem like a particularly good time to add funds, if you have been waiting for one.

Assets that stood near $45 billion at the start of July finished the month around $10 billion, and roughly half of what remains is a single illiquid private stake in Anthropic.

Leopold is 25 years old. He graduated from Columbia University at 19, as valedictorian. He worked at the FTX Future Fund from February to November of 2022, then joined OpenAI’s Superalignment team, then was fired in April 2024. Two months after the firing, he published a 165-page essay called “Situational Awareness: The Decade Ahead,” raised $225 million from Patrick and John Collison, Nat Friedman and Daniel Gross, and started a hedge fund. He had never managed money before.

Situational Awareness was constructed to express exactly two convictions.

  1. The physical build-out of AI – the chips, the memory, the power, the data centers, the neoclouds – was the trade of the decade. The fund’s disclosed long positions read like an inventory of the second derivative of the AI boom. Bloom Energy (BE), fuel cells for data centers. Sandisk (SNDK) and Micron Technology (MU), memory. CoreWeave (CRWV) and Nebius Group (NBIS), rented compute. IREN (IREN), Core Scientific, Applied Digital, Riot Platforms, CleanSpark, Bitfarms, Bitdeer – Bitcoin miners converting their substations into AI compute.

  2. Application software was going to be destroyed by AI. Not disrupted. Obliterated.

Leo explained why on Dwarkesh Patel’s podcast, in June 2024:

I’m so bearish on the wrapper companies because they’re betting on stagnation. They’re betting that you have these intermediate models and it takes so much schlep to integrate them. I’m really bearish because we’re just going to sonic boom you. We’re going to get the unhobblings. We’re going to get the drop-in remote worker. Your stuff is not going to matter.

That was the whole thesis. Buy the compute. Short the stuff that runs on the compute.

By CNBC’s reporting, the short leg included Adobe (ADBE). A 13F does not disclose short stock. It does not disclose swaps. We only know about Adobe because reporters were told… but you can look at the tape and, when you do, it’s clear that Leo was short software in a major way.

Between the June 30 close and the July 29 close – the last session before the block trade cleared his shorts – the two sides of his portfolio did this.

The longs:

  • Sandisk: down 55.32%
  • Nebius: down 46.33%
  • Bloom Energy: down 45.90%
  • CoreWeave: down 38.90%
  • Micron: down 35.98%
  • IREN: down 35.91%

The shorts, over the same 20 sessions:

  • Workday (WDAY): up 37.24%
  • Adobe (ADBE): up 28.49%
  • Intuit (INTU): up 27.64%
  • Salesforce (CRM): up 20.25%
  • Veeva Systems (VEEV): up 17.15%

Over that same window, the Invesco QQQ Trust fell 10.14% and the SPDR S&P 500 ETF Trust fell 2.32%. Nvidia – the supposed epicenter of the AI trade – fell 5.04%, and finished the full month of July up 0.33%.

This was not an AI crash.

The S&P 500 stayed near its record throughout. This was a violent rotation out of the leveraged, capital-hungry, second-derivative end of the AI complex and into the profitable, cash-generating, asset-light end of it. Which is to say: the market rotated out of exactly what he owned and into exactly what he was short.

Then there is Microsoft (MSFT).

Microsoft closed at $390.54 on Wednesday, July 29. It closed at $451.10 on Thursday, July 30 – that is a gain of 15.51% in a single session on 110.2 million shares, against a July average of 37.1 million. Yes, Microsoft reported its fiscal Q4 after the close on July 29. But the results were nothing out of the ordinary. Revenue came in at $90.00 billion against an $87.62 billion consensus – a small 2.7% beat. Earnings were $4.74 per share against $4.21. It was a good quarter. Not a historic one. A 2.7% revenue beat does not add roughly $450 billion of market value to the most widely owned company on Earth in six and a half hours.

The reason Microsoft was up 15% is extremely important. Leo blew up quickly because of leverage. But he failed because he is simply wrong.

Aschenbrenner’s software thesis rests on a single premise: that a company selling enterprise software is selling the work the software performs. If a model can perform that work, the company is worth nothing.

That premise is what a very smart 25-year-old engineer believes. It is not what anyone who has ever run a business believes.

Nobody buys Microsoft because Microsoft writes the best code. They buy Microsoft because Microsoft is the rail everything else runs on. Active Directory is where your employee identities live. Excel is where your board deck’s numbers come from. Teams is where the compliance-recorded conversation happens. Azure holds a FedRAMP High authorization and Department of Defense Impact Level 5 clearance, which means a defense contractor cannot casually swap it out for something cheaper without re-clearing the entire stack with the government.

Veeva Systems runs the customer relationship management and regulatory document systems of the pharmaceutical industry. Nineteen of the top 20 biopharmaceutical companies use Veeva’s regulatory information management platform. Those systems are validated under GxP – the good-practice quality regulations that govern anything touching a drug – and 21 CFR Part 11, the Food And Drug Administration’s (“FDA”) rule for electronic records and signatures. Every major release is formally qualified. When an FDA inspector arrives, the audit trail in that system is the company’s defense.

You cannot replace that with a model that is very good at writing code. You would have to re-validate a decade of regulated records, in front of a regulator, on a system with no track record, to save a fee that rounds to nothing compared with the cost of building a new drug.

How small a fee? Veeva’s licensing runs somewhere between roughly $1,800 and $6,600 per sales representative per year. A fully loaded pharmaceutical sales rep costs the employer between $134,000 and $219,000 a year. The software is 1% to 5% of the cost of the person using it.

Microsoft raised the price of a Microsoft 365 E3 seat from $36 to $39 per user per month on July 1 of this year, and E5 from $57 to $60. Add Copilot at $30 and a fully loaded E5 seat costs $1,080 a year. Against a knowledge worker costing $120,000 all-in, that is roughly 1% of the employee.

This is the part the compute maximalists cannot see. These companies are not selling labor. They are selling the rails on which labor runs, at a price so far below the value created that the buyer never bothers to negotiate hard, and with switching costs so high that the buyer could not leave even if he wanted to.

Do people try to leave? Constantly. And they almost always fail. (Ask me how I know!)

Panorama Consulting Group tracked studies of enterprise resource planning replacements and found average cost overruns at 189% across industries. Gartner projects that by 2027, more than 70% of recently implemented ERP (enterprise resource planning) initiatives will fail to fully meet their original business goals. Ripping out a core enterprise system is one of the most reliably disastrous things a large company can attempt, and it was true before anyone had heard of a transformer model.

The incumbents are not being disintermediated by artificial intelligence. They are selling it!

Next, I’ll explain how Aschenbrenner went terribly wrong. He thought AI would eat the applications. Instead, the applications are selling AI as an upsell on top of a subscription the customer cannot afford to cancel.

Tell me what you think of today’s Daily Journal: porterstansberrydirect@gmail.com

Good investing,

F. Porter Stansberry
Stevenson, Maryland

Presented By: Tuttle Capital Management


3 Things To Know Before We Go…

1. More than half of young investors have pulled money out of their portfolios to bet on sports. Betterment, an automated investing platform, surveyed 1,000 American retail investors in the spring. Among Gen Z respondents – born between 1997 and 2007 – 52% said they redirected money originally earmarked for investing into sports wagers over the past year, and 26% called sports betting a deliberate part of their long-term financial plan. What could go wrong?

2. American consumers are tapping the brakes. July retail sales fell 0.6% – the steepest monthly drop since May 2025 and well below the +0.1% consensus. The weakness was broad across non-store retailers, including Amazon (AMZN) where sales fell 2.2%, the second-largest decline since July 2021, while auto and parts sales dropped 1.8%. Most telling, control-group sales – the cleanest read on underlying demand that feeds directly into GDP – plunged 0.4%, the worst since January 2025. A stretched consumer is starting to show up in the data.

3. The federal government just posted its largest July deficit on record. The U.S. Treasury reported a $432 billion shortfall for the month – $334 billion of revenue versus $766 billion of spending. Interest on the debt cost $118 billion in July alone, $26 billion more than a year earlier, bringing the fiscal-year total to $1.17 trillion. That is more than the government spends on the entire military, and it is now running even with Medicare. Ten months into fiscal 2026, the deficit stands at $1.8 trillion. Every quarter-point move higher in Treasury yields adds tens of billions to that interest bill as old low-rate debt matures and gets refinanced. Washington cannot afford higher rates.


Chart Of The Day… BWX Technologies (BWXT)

Nuclear-parts provider BWX Technologies (BWXT) has tripled from our 2022 recommendation in Complete Investor – providing the power that powers the AI buildout.



The post Leopold Was Wrong appeared first on Porter & Co..

  • ✇Porter & Co
  • Trade Alert: Adding To Cellebrite Position Porter &#38 · Co.
    Today we’re recommending buying additional shares of digital-forensics software platform Cellebrite (Nasdaq: CLBT) via the following trade recommendation: Action To Take: Buy 200 shares of Cellebrite (Nasdaq: CLBT) up to $13 per share – the recent price was $11.26 Note that this recommendation comes on top of the existing 400 shares of Cellebrite we’ve previously recommended buying, bringing our total recommended position size to 600 shares. As mentioned in last week’s update, we believe Ce
     

Trade Alert: Adding To Cellebrite Position

24 August 2026 at 10:12

Today we’re recommending buying additional shares of digital-forensics software platform Cellebrite (Nasdaq: CLBT) via the following trade recommendation:

Action To Take: Buy 200 shares of Cellebrite (Nasdaq: CLBT) up to $13 per share – the recent price was $11.26

Note that this recommendation comes on top of the existing 400 shares of Cellebrite we’ve previously recommended buying, bringing our total recommended position size to 600 shares.

As mentioned in last week’s update, we believe Cellebrite shares are deeply undervalued. We view the 30% drop following its Q2 earnings report as an extreme overreaction to a minor hiccup in its sales growth rate. And after last week’s expiration of our covered-call position on shares of LandBridge (NYSE: LB), which resulted in an additional $7,500 in available cash, we’re recommending reinvesting a portion of this freed-up cash into today’s new trade.

Good investing,

Ross Hendricks
Porter & Co.

The post Trade Alert: Adding To Cellebrite Position appeared first on Porter & Co..

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  • Following The Smart Money In Q2 Porter &#38 · Co.
    In today’s Sunday Stock Screen, we’re “Following The Smart Money” by looking closely at the 13F filings from Wall Street’s top money managers. And in today’s Sunday Selection, we report on a dominant retail company whose margins are vanishing – the crowd sees deterioration, but the world’s top fund managers see an empire spending today’s profits to own the next decade In the tables below, we show the latest (Q2 2026) new stock buys – as reported in their most recent 13F filings with the Securiti
     

Following The Smart Money In Q2

23 August 2026 at 07:00

In today’s Sunday Stock Screen, we’re “Following The Smart Money” by looking closely at the 13F filings from Wall Street’s top money managers.

And in today’s Sunday Selection, we report on a dominant retail company whose margins are vanishing – the crowd sees deterioration, but the world’s top fund managers see an empire spending today’s profits to own the next decade

In the tables below, we show the latest (Q2 2026) new stock buys – as reported in their most recent 13F filings with the Securities And Exchange Commission – of some of our favorite fund managers. We also show what percentage each stock makes up within each fund’s investment portfolio.

In addition to tracking new purchases, we pay attention to any “big bets” these asset managers make – comprising at least 5% of the portfolio.

⚙ Edit 🗑 Delete

(Several of the companies on the two lists above are also recommended stocks in Porter Stansberry’s Complete Investor… to learn more about joining Complete Investor – and find out which stock those are, and why we recommended them – go here.)

Highs And Lows

Each week, we also monitor any stocks in the market making a new 52-week high. We do this because any stock on its way to generating 2x, 3x, or 10x returns will spend a lot of time making 52-week highs along the way. Thus the new 52-week-high list provides an opportunity to flag these potential high performers before they really break out, with a particular emphasis on lower-profile, less widely-followed stocks that might have otherwise gone unnoticed.

Notable stocks making a new 52-week high this week:

  • Eli Lilly (LLY)

  • JP Morgan Chase (JPM)

  • Visa (V)

  • Johnson & Johnson (JNJ)

  • AbbVie (ABBV)

  • Coca-Cola (KO)

  • Merck (MRK)

  • Amgen (AMGN)

  • Thermo Fisher Scientific (TMO)

  • Charles Schwab (SCHW)

  • Union Pacific (UNP)

  • ConocoPhillips (COP)

  • Pfizer (PFE)

  • Vertex Pharmaceuticals (VRTX)

  • Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMY)

  • Airbnb (ABNB)

  • General Dynamics (GD)

  • Marathon Petroleum (MPC)

  • Valero Energy (VLO)

  • Phillips 66 (PSX)

  • 3M Company (MMM)

  • Regeneron Pharmaceuticals (REGN)


How to Profit From”The SpaceX Supercycle”

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Editor’s Note: Keep in mind, we only accept advertising from publishers we know to offer well-researched ideas vetted by a legal team, excellent customer service, and reasonable refund policies. Brownstone is one such partner. We do not, however, under any circumstances make any representations about their investment ideas or strategies, nor will we warrant them as equal to our own. We do recognize that the markets are tempestuous and, at times, ideas that we may not endorse prove valuable.


We also monitor stocks on the new 52-week-low list. In many cases, the names on this list are there for good reason – the market is often correctly pricing in their weak fundamentals. However, once in a while, a great business with excellent long-term prospects finds itself on this list due to a temporary setback. This can create the rare opportunity to buy top-shelf merchandise at bargain-basement prices.

Notable stocks making a new 52-week low last week:

  • AppLovin (APP)

  • CRH plc (CRH)

  • AutoZone (AZO)

  • Medline (MDLN)

  • Public Service Enterprise Group (PEG)

  • Kroger (KR)

  • Martin Marietta Materials (MLM)

  • FedEx Freight Holding (FDXF)

  • Rollins (ROL)

  • Lennox International (LII)

  • JBT Marel (JBTM)

  • Brookfield Business (BBUC)

  • Icahn Enterprises (IEP)

  • Liftoff Mobile (LFTO)

  • PagSeguro Digital (PAGS)

  • StoneCo (STNE)

Today’s Sunday Selection comes off one of our “Following The Smart Money” screens – and it is one of the most dominant online retailers in the world. Two weeks ago, it reported its fastest quarterly revenue growth in four years – crossing $10 billion for the first time in its history, up 50% year over year (“YOY”), while adding 18 million new customers in 12 months.

Yet the shares sit roughly 25% below their 52-week high as the market is fixated on margins. The company is in the middle of a deliberate investment cycle – spending today’s profits to extend its lead across an entire continent – and the market is punishing the stock for it. Yet the world’s top fund managers were buying while the market complained. We have seen this movie before, from this company: the last time it invested this heavily, the bears insisted it would never earn consistent profits, its margins went on to set record after record, and the stock compounded several times over for investors who bought at the trough.

We believe a similar moment is approaching, making this a strong candidate for the Complete Investor recommendation list.

⚙ Edit 🗑 Delete

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The company is MercadoLibre (Nasdaq: MELI) – the Amazon (AMZN), PayPal (PYPL), and Shopify (SHOP) of Latin America rolled into a single business. Calling MercadoLibre an online retailer understates it the way calling Amazon a bookstore did in 2005. Founded in Buenos Aires in 1999 and listed on Nasdaq since 2007, the company operates across 18 countries through three interlocking businesses.

The marketplace, MercadoLibre, is the dominant e-commerce platform in Latin America – roughly 35% share in Brazil (more than double Amazon), 68% in home-market Argentina, and a strong second position in Mexico. It served 89 million unique buyers last quarter, with gross merchandise volume (“GMV”) up 36% YOY on a currency-neutral basis, and generated $16.3 billion of revenue in 2025 – 56% of the total.

The fintech arm, Mercado Pago, began as a checkout tool and is now one of Latin America’s largest financial platforms – digital wallet, merchant acquiring, asset management, and, increasingly, credit. Total payment volume passed $100 billion last quarter, 88 million people use Pago monthly, and in Brazil it is the most-used wallet after the government’s own Pix system. This fintech arm generated $12.6 billion of revenue in 2025, or 44% of the total. Within it, credit revenue reached $5.9 billion, up 63% in a year, on a $16.4 billion loan book growing 75% with non-performing loans near historical lows and net interest margins widening.

The logistics network, Mercado Envios, is what makes the marketplace credible: fulfillment centers, more than 10,000 drop-off points, and the fastest delivery network in the region, moving roughly three-quarters of fast shipments within 48 hours. Unit shipping costs in Brazil fell 17% last year even as volumes surged – scale economics working as designed.

Each business feeds the others. Shoppers adopt the wallet, wallet users get offered credit, credit makes shoppers buy more, and sellers fund advertising to reach them. Users active in both commerce and fintech grew 37% last quarter – faster than either side alone – and management says these dual-ecosystem users are multiples more profitable than single-platform users. That is the MercadoLibre flywheel.

The flywheel has driven revenue nearly vertical: $15.1 billion in 2023, $20.8 billion in 2024, and $28.9 billion in 2025. The profit line tells a different story, and it is the part the market keeps focusing on. MercadoLibre runs in deliberate investment cycles. When management sees an opening, it spends through the income statement to seize it – growth accelerates and margins compress. Then the investments mature and the profits arrive.

The company has completed this loop once at full scale. From 2016 to 2019, it transformed from a high-margin marketplace into an integrated commerce, logistics, and payments ecosystem – and paid for it with profits. Operating margin went from 21.4% in 2016 to negative 6.7% in 2019 while bears insisted the company would never earn consistent profits. Then margins recovered to a record 14.6% – on revenue that had grown 10-fold from its 2018 level – and the market capitalization went from $13 billion at the end of 2018 to $84 billion by the end of 2020, a more than six-fold increase in two years.

Here is the detail that matters most for timing: the stock rose 92% in 2019 – nearly 3x the Nasdaq’s gain in a year when falling rates lifted everything. The market did not wait for the margin inflection to appear in the headlines. It re-rated the stock as soon as the evidence showed the spending was changing customer behavior and would eventually monetize. By the time reported margins recovered, the easy money had been made.

The 2021-2022 drawdown is the counterexample that sharpens the rule: margins improved steadily and the stock still fell more than 65% peak-to-trough as rising rates crushed growth multiples. The market prices the expected return on MercadoLibre’s investments – margins are one signal within that judgment, and often a lagging one.

Today’s cycle is the broadest yet, and the result is the paradox in last quarter’s report – revenue up 50%, operating margin down about 50% (at 6.7% versus 12.2% a year ago). And the early evidence looks like 2019: conversion, purchase frequency, retention, and category breadth are all rising.

What has not happened yet is the payoff. By our math, the realized incremental return on the roughly $9 billion to$13 billion deployed in this cycle so far is only about 2% to 3% – versus the mid-teens-to-30%-plus returns the prior cycles eventually earned. That gap is the current opportunity.

The segment data makes the strategy legible: Argentina is the fortress that funds the wars, Brazil is the battleground, Mexico is the contested frontier, and everything else is seed corn for the next cycle.

Argentina generated $6.0 billion of 2025 revenue (21% of the total), up 56%, and more than $2.5 billion of direct contribution profit – more than Brazil, on 40% of Brazil’s revenue. With 68% market share and a fintech-heavy mix, it is a monopoly tollbooth earning a contribution margin above 40%, with enormous macro torque as credit strengthens under Argentina’s normalization.

Brazil, at $15.2 billion of revenue (53%), up 33%, is where the money is going. Direct contribution profit fell from $2.3 billion to $2.1 billion in 2025 even as revenue grew by $3.8 billion – each incremental dollar of Brazil revenue arrived with slightly more than a dollar of direct costs attached. The engagement response has been immediate: items sold up 56% last quarter, items per buyer up 19%, and conversion up 1.1 points.

Mexico, at $6.5 billion of revenue (22%), up 39%, is the one major market where Amazon leads – roughly 40% to 30% share – and the capital allocation shows how seriously it believes in this opportunity. Mexico’s gross property and equipment now nearly equals Brazil’s on only 40% of the revenue, while the segment still earns an 18% contribution margin.

The remaining markets – Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Uruguay – produced $1.3 billion of revenue (4%), up 41%.

Three levers drive the next leg of growth. Credit is the largest and MercadoLibre is well positioned with years of granular purchase data no bank can see, formal credit penetration in Latin America still a fraction of developed-market levels, and mature non-card lending that is highly profitable today. Advertising is the highest-margin opportunity: Mercado Ads grew 62% last quarter and now exceeds 10% of Latin American digital advertising. And AI is quietly deflating the cost base: the majority of the company’s code is now AI-written, product development fell from 8.4% to 7.2% of revenue, and customer service headcount dropped from 10,000 to 7,000 while the business tripled.

The credit book is the real risk. This cycle is far more credit- and balance-sheet-intensive than 2016–2019, and credit metrics always look best right before they do not. Competition is intensifying, currency remains a permanent tax on reported results, and the valuation – nearly 50x trailing earnings – is cheap only against the stock’s own history. And unlike 2019, there is no help from lower rates – long yields are moving higher globally, so the re-rating must be carried by the operating evidence alone.

The stock sits roughly 25% below its June 2025 high while revenue grows 50%. And the multiple is measured against earnings the company is deliberately suppressing – so the 50x trailing earnings overstates what investors are paying for the underlying earning power. If revenue reaches $50 billion and margins recover merely to 10% to 12%, operating profit climbs toward $5 billion – meaning today’s roughly $95 billion market capitalization is paying about 20x that earning power, for a business still compounding revenue at more than 20% a year.

Management has spent 27 years proving it knows how to allocate capital across a reinvestment runway that is nowhere near exhausted. History says the stock will not wait for the evidence to be complete – which is what makes MercadoLibre a strong candidate for the Complete Investor recommendation list… but not yet.

Porter & Co.
Stevenson, Maryland

The post Following The Smart Money In Q2 appeared first on Porter & Co..

  • ✇Porter & Co
  • August 2026 Best Buys Porter &#38 · Co.
    A Business That’s More Efficient Than Japanese Efficiency Edit Delete Editor’s note: This is Porter & Co.’s Best Buys, which we release to paid subscribers on the fourth Saturday of each month… If you’re not yet a subscriber to Best Buys, to access the full paid issue and our previous Best Buys, please click here. Still, 81 years later, the last of the Pumpkin Bombs is still missing. You wouldn’t think they’d be hard to find – 10,000 pounds of bright orangey-yellow metal packed w
     

August 2026 Best Buys

22 August 2026 at 07:00

A Business That’s More Efficient Than Japanese Efficiency

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Editor’s note: This is Porter & Co.’s Best Buys, which we release to paid subscribers on the fourth Saturday of each month… If you’re not yet a subscriber to Best Buys, to access the full paid issue and our previous Best Buys, please click here.

Still, 81 years later, the last of the Pumpkin Bombs is still missing.

You wouldn’t think they’d be hard to find – 10,000 pounds of bright orangey-yellow metal packed with 5,500 pounds of explosive, each 10-foot-long, blimp-shaped Pumpkin was practically visible from space…

They were also a top-secret tactic hiding in plain sight.

Starting in 1944, Manhattan Project scientists built a pile of Pumpkins to exacting specs: they were the same size and weight as Fat Man, the nuclear bomb that would ultimately help end World War II when it fell on Hiroshima.

During the final weeks of the war, American bombers dropped 49 of the rotund Pumpkins throughout the Japanese countryside, as a dress rehearsal for the real thing. The pilots of Enola Gay and Bockscar – the planes that would release Fat Man and its twin, Little Boy – got practice handling the massive weapons, and the Japanese got used to dodging big, fat, oblong bombs. They’d be less likely to notice Fat Man until it was too late.

The Pumpkins weren’t nuclear, but they packed a powerful wallop. During July and August 1945, the pilots of the 509th Composite Group – a specially-trained Air Force unit who’d trained at a classified base in Utah – strafed Japan with Pumpkins, killing around 400 people and wounding a thousand more.

As the 509th honed their aim, they flattened schools, shopping districts, random mountainsides, and the moat of the Imperial Palace.

Not to mention a little car company called Toyota…

By 1945, Toyota – founded in 1926 as an automatic loom factory – was already off to a rocky start. After president Kiichiro Toyoda (who changed the company name slightly for good fortune) started building cars in 1937, the Japanese government had quickly commandeered the assembly lines to make war vehicles.

With Emperor Hirohito calling the shots, Toyoda shuttered production on his Model AA passenger car and focused on assembling military trucks. The government offered one-fifth of the payment upfront and the rest of the cash on delivery. It wasn’t the best business model, but it kept the lights on.

Until the Pumpkin fell, anyway.

By August 14, Fat Man and Little Boy had dropped, but Japan was still embroiled in tense surrender negotiations. Bockscar – the Boeing B-29 that had delivered Fat Man on August 9 – had time to kill and Pumpkins to spare.

So one day before the war officially ended, the plane swerved over the main Toyota plant in Koromo and released one of the last Pumpkins of World War II. A quarter of the facility went up in flames and the whole production line shut down, while two-thirds of the workers went AWOL and never came back.

The next day, Emperor Hirohito formally surrendered via radio broadcast.

The U.S. had 66 leftover Pumpkins, but not for long. Air Force crews quietly escorted the remaining orange bombs 10 miles into the Pacific and tipped the barges into uncharted water.

Of the 49 Pumpkins that were deployed, 48 are accounted for. Japanese researcher Koki Nishioka thinks the final missing Pumpkin is nose-down somewhere in the Kobe region, and he’s still walking the hills with his metal detector, searching.

As the smoke cleared, Toyoda – fearing he’d never build cars again – scraped together a few warehouses and repurposed equipment to assemble radios and grind flour. It took two years to rebuild the squashed Koromo factory. In 1947, American occupying forces finally gave Kiichiro Toyoda the green light to start stamping out automobiles once more.

This did not go so well.

Toyota’s production process was clunky at the best of times, and post-Pumpkin, it devolved into chaos. Foremen scrapped huge batches of parts whenever engineers goofed up – which meant it often took up to a year to make minor design updates. On the floor, workmen clashed over whether to use inches, meters, or the traditional Japanese measuring system, while an ongoing steel shortage and violent labor disputes gummed the works up further.

Toyota was routinely losing up to 300 yen on every 3,500-yen vehicle that rolled off the assembly line, which translated to 8% losses per year.

Staggering under the disapproval of his ancestors, Kiichiro Toyoda moaned,

It was hard for me to bear the fact that Toyota was complacently producing such low-quality vehicles. I felt guilty for many years and lived the difficult life of an outcast.

During the late 1940s – as Japan struggled through the continued humiliation of American occupation – Toyota’s ancestors continued to frown. By 1949, the company was unable to pay its wages, heavily in debt and facing possible bankruptcy. A visit overseas to Ford – which was then producing 80,000 units to Toyota’s 40 – did nothing to improve morale.

In 1950, Toyoda resigned as president, washing his hands of the mess he’d created. He took his unluckily-spelled last name with him, which was maybe a good thing…

That June, the flailing Toyota factory received an unexpected rush order from the Pentagon… for 4,679 Model BM trucks. The Korean War had just broken out, and the U.S. needed a close cross-border supplier for army vehicles.

At 3.66 billion yen, the contract was, in the words of the Bank of Japan, “divine aid.” It also posed some problems, such as, how the hell would they get all this done by October?

Enter W. Edwards Deming, the American efficiency expert that everyone would rather forget…

I Don’t Get No Respect

“Japanese efficiency” is a perennial buzzword in corporate culture, but frankly, Japanese industry started out as a hot mess. Japan’s famed efficiency culture comes straight from a Wyoming quality-control expert.

W. Edwards Deming traveled to Japan in 1947 to help conduct a census, and stayed to lecture on statistics. By 1950, he was drawing crowds of business leaders to seminars on his PDCA Cycle, a continuous, rolling checklist of Plan-Do-Check-Act.

The Check part of the cycle was where Toyota kept screwing up. Deming explained that it was counterproductive to inspect products for flaws after they rolled off the assembly line – it was much more efficient to troubleshoot while they were still being built.

Deming hadn’t had much luck suggesting these ideas to hard-headed American car manufacturers – but the Toyota team was eager for any help they could get. Toyota’s new president, Taizo Ishida, and chief production engineer Taiichi Ohno quickly implemented Deming’s ideas. They also added some Japanese flourishes: Kaizen (continuous improvement), Jidoka (automation with a human touch), and Kanban boards, a visual way to streamline production.

Conveniently erasing Deming from the picture (and from their promotional materials), they dubbed the new method the Toyota Way.

The turnaround was instant. Armed with Deming’s quality-control magic, Toyota successfully fulfilled its Korean War truck contract and went on to double its book value and crush production goals over the next five years. (By then, surprise, Kiichiro Toyoda wanted to come back on board as CEO, but he died of a cerebral hemorrhage before he could rejoin.)

As the decades rolled on, the Toyota Way (really, the Deming Way) transformed a pumpkin-flavored pancake into America’s number-one import car, a business that would outperform both Ford Motor and General Motors during the 1970s gas crisis. By the mid-1980s, Toyota was building its own factories on American soil and producing 4 million vehicles a year, a close second to Ford.

By then, Ford and other American companies were reaching out to W. Edwards Deming, begging him to re-design their own assembly lines. Too little, too late…

After a lifetime of snubs from American companies – and watching Japanese companies take credit for his ideas – Deming was too worn out to do much more consulting. He died in the early 1990s, efficient to the end: he left behind a refrigerator full of eggs with penciled expiration dates, arranged oldest to newest.

His quality-control system had a far longer shelf life.

Poached!

In 1986, after becoming the first foreign company to sell 1 million cars in America, Toyota realized it had another valuable commodity to export: good advice.

Hand-picking several of his top efficiency experts, CEO Taiichi Ohno sent them out with his blessing to form a consulting company called Shingijutsu, which would teach all sorts of companies how to implement the mystical Toyota Way.

They were quick to point out that if you really wanted to put the Way into practice, you had to come work at Toyota – but they were happy to teach you how to personalize a version for your own factory… for a hefty fee, of course.

Shingijutsu’s experts traveled to large industrial companies to tutor them in Japanese efficiency, also known as “lean” manufacturing, and by various cult-y sounding buzz phrases like Just In Time and “Six Sigma.” Underneath all the window dressing, it was the same old PDCA Cycle from poor, forgotten W. Edwards Deming.

And cult-y sounding or not, it worked like a charm. During the 1990s, a rash of high-profile companies adopted “lean” principles with spectacular results: Motorola saved $16 billion and eliminated 90% of its semiconductor defects, General Electric reduced production time on its engines by 30% and moved 50% more inventory off the floor, and on and on. Today versions of the Toyota Way are still maximizing efficiency at some of the largest Fortune 500 companies, including Boeing, Caterpillar, and Deere & Co.

The 40-year-old company we are recommending in this issue of Best Buys is one of them…

A $150 billion science and tech juggernaut, this company credits its success largely to a personalized version of the Toyota Way that its CEO learned from Shingijutsu’s traveling experts. Happily for us, its performance has been unfairly overlooked, making it a world-class business at an ideal entry point.

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1. Danaher (NYSE: DHR)

Danaher (NYSE: DHR) is a science, medicine, and technology firm that owns and operates dozens of specialized companies.

Why We Recommended Danaher

With a market cap of $150 billion, Danaher owns nearly 20 companies across three industry segments, generating close to $25 billion in annual revenue.

Growing through acquisition is a fairly common practice – in fact, there are more than $2 trillion in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) every year. But three-quarters of these M&A transactions fail, and wind up destroying shareholder value.

Danaher defies these odds because it doesn’t just “buy” a business. It ensures its money is put to good use. To do this, inspired by Japanese efficiency, it created a playbook for transforming good companies into great ones – it is part of the company’s guiding philosophy called the Danaher Business System. It is a systematic way to build efficiencies for supercharging profit margins and returns on capital, regardless of the business model or industry.

Since its founding in 1984, Danaher’s success following this approach is reflected in its financial performance. Over its 40 years, the company has compounded shareholder capital at an incredible 21% per year. That’s nearly twice the S&P 500’s compounded annual return of 11.6% over the same period.

Why Danaher Is A Best Buy

Danaher has fallen out of favor after a post-COVID hangover from the boom and subsequent bust in sales of respiratory testing equipment. But now, after two years of destocking excess inventories, Q1 2026 bioprocessing equipment orders grew more than 30% year-over-year (“YOY”) for the first positive order growth in nearly two years.

The recovery that began in Q1 continued into Q2, with Danaher’s net income up 60% YOY to $1.23 per share. Importantly, the company’s measure of core revenue, which excludes respiratory testing, increased by 4.5%, indicating that the core demand for bioprocessing equipment and services is returning to growth after the multi-year post-COVID slump.

Management raised its full-year 2026 outlook for earnings per share to $8.53, up from a prior forecast of $8.45. Meanwhile, the business continues to generate a healthy amount of cash, with free cash flow up 15% YOY to $1.3 billion in Q2.

With 80% of revenue coming from a stable source of recurring orders of consumables, reagents, and service, the core business remains stable and recession-resistant. Trading at around $200, we’re getting a chance to buy into this long-term compounder at 23x earnings, just as the business reaches an inflection back to consistent earnings growth.

Action to Take: Buy Danaher (NYSE: DHR) up to $250 per share

2. Versamet Royalties (Nasdaq: VMET)

Versamet Royalties (Nasdaq: VMET) is a fast-growing precious metal royalty company.

Why We Recommended Versamet Royalties

Versamet Royalties (Nasdaq: VMET) is one of the fastest growing precious metals royalty companies in the world. Since 2022, it has increased royalty production volumes from zero to 10,000 gold-equivalent-ounces (“GEOs”) and is on track to double in size this year to 20,000–23,000 GEOs.

Royalty and streaming companies are the tollbooths of the mining world. Rather than operating mines – with all the capital expenditures, labor, and operating risks that entails – royalty companies provide upfront financing to miners in exchange for a percentage of future production (royalties) or the right to purchase metal at a fixed, below-market price (streams).

Led by CEO Daniel O’Flaherty, who holds one of the greatest track records in the industry, Versamet has been compounding at 50% annually across every meaningful metric – revenue, cash flow, production – without issuing equity or having to invest in mine development. Since the company began trading on the Nasdaq just six months ago, on March 6, most investors have not heard of it, so the stock is still cheap. At around $10 per share, the business trades at a market cap of $1.1 billion. And based on current gold prices of $4,500 per ounce, we expect the business will generate close to $100 million in revenue this year, with staggeringly high operating margins above 90%.

We see several catalysts ahead that will unlock significant shareholder value, including a major acquisition of a royalty stream on one of Canada’s most promising new gold mines. As more catalysts begin to unfold, and as more analysts begin covering Versamet and it becomes eligible for index inclusion, this will likely lead to a significant re-valuation of its shares.

Why Versamet Royalties Is A Best Buy

On August 13, Versamet reported its fourth consecutive record quarter since going public. Revenue of $23.7 million was up nearly fivefold YOY, GEOs hit a record 5,255, and the cash cost margin reached 93%. Management reaffirmed 2026 guidance of 20,000 to 23,000 GEOs. And by 2028, once Skeena Resources’ Eskay Creek open-pit, gold/silver mine in British Columbia reaches production, Versamet’s output climbs past 30,000 GEOs on our conservative base case, with analyst consensus near 40,000. That’s a quadrupling in four years – without operating a single mine or spending an additional dollar of capital on expansion.

Eskay Creek is Versamet’s cornerstone acquisition and is the reason we’re elevating VMET shares now. In April, Versamet paid $360 million for a 3.52% life-of-mine gold stream on Eskay Creek – the restart of what was historically one of the highest-grade precious metals mines on Earth, producing 3.3 million ounces at 45 grams per tonne during its 1994–2008 run in British Columbia’s Golden Triangle. Operator Skeena Resources has construction 62% complete, fully permitted, with first production targeted for Q2 2027. Once running, Eskay Creek sends Versamet more than 10,000 ounces of gold per year – roughly $45 million in annual revenue at current gold prices – and Versamet funded 94% of the purchase with debt, issuing just 2% in new shares.

Versamet trades at 10x 2027 estimated cash flow. Its royalty peers – Franco-Nevada (FNV), Wheaton Precious Metals (WPM), Triple Flag Precious Metals (TFPM), and the rest – average 18x to 20x. A re-rate to the bottom of the peer range roughly doubles the stock – and that’s before any credit for rising gold prices, which flow almost entirely to the bottom line at a 90% margin.

The mechanical buyers are already arriving. Daily trading volume has risen roughly tenfold since late 2025. MSCI added VMET to its Small Cap Index in May. And the company expects to meet inclusion criteria for GDXJ – the most widely held junior gold exchange-traded fund (“ETF”) – in the second half of this year. Index inclusion forces buying, regardless of price.

Action to Take: Buy Versamet Royalties (Nasdaq: VMET) up to $24 per share

3. Salesforce (NYSE: CRM)

Salesforce (NYSE: CRM) is the world’s leading cloud-based customer relationship management platform.

Why We Recommended Salesforce

Salesforce (NYSE: CRM) is a global leader in cloud-based software, specializing in customer relationship management solutions. With a $140 billion market cap, it generates just over $40 billion in annual revenue. Salesforce empowers businesses of all sizes to connect with customers in innovative ways through its integrated online software platform. The company’s core offerings include tools for sales, customer service, marketing automation, analytics, and application development. These products are all designed to enhance customer engagement and streamline business processes. With a strong focus on digital transformation, Salesforce serves industries ranging from small startups to Fortune 500 enterprises.

Salesforce has 72,000 employees worldwide, serving 150,000 customers. Company revenue has increased at a compound annual growth rate of 24% since 2004, when shares went public. In fact, its revenue has never been down YOY – even during the 2008 Global Financial Crisis or the COVID pandemic.

Why Salesforce Is A Best Buy

In a single trading session in February, $285 billion in market cap evaporated from enterprise software stocks like Salesforce. At its April 10 low, the iShares Expanded Tech-Software ETF (IGV) had fallen 35% from its 2025 high.

The consensus explanation was that artificial intelligence (“AI”) is eating software – and that software companies’ days are numbered. But it’s not as simple as that: not all software companies are dying, and the companies that survive this paradigm shift will be more valuable than the old ones ever were.

Salesforce has seen its stock hit heavily recently – down 22% year-to-date – largely driven by this investor anxiety regarding how its traditional user-based licensing model will survive as AI replaces human roles. In response, Salesforce has pivoted its pricing structure toward consumption-based billing, charging per automated task completed rather than per human worker.

Its plan seems to be working, as Salesforce is performing strongly: for fiscal Q1 2027, released on May 27, revenue rose 13% YOY to $11.1 billion, and EPS of $3.88 beat consensus estimates by 24%, signaling that the company’s past cost-cutting efforts are heavily falling to the bottom line. Crucially, its critical growth catalyst, Agentforce, crossed the $1 billion annualized recurring revenue (“ARR”) milestone, proving real enterprise adoption. ARR is up roughly 205% YOY, proving the enterprise adoption thesis.

Management returned $27.5 billion to shareholders during the quarter, highlighted by a $25 billion accelerated share-repurchase program. While the enterprise software landscape remains sluggish, Salesforce’s aggressive buybacks and embrace of AI will continue to drive its growth.

Salesforce reports Q2 2027 earnings on August 26, with guidance for revenue around $11.3 billion (up about 10% YOY) and consensus estimates for EPS near $3.10.

At roughly $200 per share, Salesforce trades at less than 15x forward earnings. While shares have rallied roughly 25% since we recommended Salesforce as a Best Buy in July, it’s still trading at a multiple that prices it as a disruption victim. That discount will shrink as Salesforce continues to execute.

Action to Take: Buy Salesforce (NYSE: CRM) up to $251 per share

Every month, we highlight three current recommendations that are at an attractive buy point, and we include those with the best buying opportunity as our Best Buys. While we sometimes alternate which companies we list as our Best Buys, removing a stock from the list does not necessarily mean we no longer recommend it – nor does it imply a recommendation to sell shares in that company once it is no longer a Best Buys. It’s only that the new picks present an even more compelling investment opportunity.

Important: Porter & Co. intends to invest $500,000 of its own capital in securities in our Best Buys, including several of the recommendations written about above. Porter & Co.’s decision to purchase these stocks should not be considered personalized financial advice. Probably not surprising to you, but if we like a stock or bond, we buy it. Some people don’t like that, while others think it’s a good sign if the analyst has skin in the game. It’s also a good idea to consult with an investment professional before purchasing any securities – maybe even run it by your mother or golfing buddies. And there’s more… Porter & Co. does not recommend positions in unregulated securities because there are plenty of good ones that are regulated.

Porter & Co.
Stevenson, Maryland

The post August 2026 Best Buys appeared first on Porter & Co..

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  • The Day “Safe” Stopped Feeling Safe Porter &#38 · Co.
    Issue#145, Volume#3 What’s Replacing The Traditional 60/40 Stocks/Bonds Portfolio Inside Today’s Issue Essay: The Day “Safe” Stopped Feeling Safe An Important Market Warning Sign Gets Louder Axon’s New Deals Trouble At Broadcom Chart Of The Day… Franco-Nevada (FNV) Today’s Mailbag Editor’s note: Today, Porter turns the Daily Journal over to Matt Tuttle, CEO of Tuttle Capital Management and portfolio manager of the Porter & Company Porter Portfolio Index ETF (PCPP). It was April 8, 20
     

The Day “Safe” Stopped Feeling Safe

21 August 2026 at 13:00

Issue#145, Volume#3

What’s Replacing The Traditional 60/40 Stocks/Bonds Portfolio


Editor’s note: Today, Porter turns the Daily Journal over to Matt Tuttle, CEO of Tuttle Capital Management and portfolio manager of the Porter & Company Porter Portfolio Index ETF (PCPP).


It was April 8, 2025, about 20 minutes after the market open.

I’d already made my peace with the equity screen on my desk. The S&P 500 had given up 10.5% in the two sessions after U.S. President Donald Trump’s “Liberation Day” tariff announcement, bad enough to be the fifth-worst two-day stretch in 75 years.

And then there was the other screen.

The long bond was falling too. Not holding… not lagging… but plummeting. According to the conventions of portfolio management sold by Wall Street, a free-falling long bond while stocks were collapsing was precisely what was not supposed to happen.

By the end of what was a very long week, the 30-year Treasury closed at 4.85%, the sharpest weekly jump in long-dated yields since 1982. (The way a bond works is that when its yield rises, the price falls.)

This was big trouble for anyone with a classic 60/40 stocks/bonds portfolio. The airbag didn’t deploy because bonds – the asset that’s generally supposed to go up, when stocks go down – was going down too.

Three Times Is Not Bad Luck

I’d seen this movie before.

Three times in 17 years, the hedge – the asset that was supposed to be the ballast – didn’t hedge.

In 2008, during the Global Financial Crisis, Treasuries held. Stocks lost 37%, long Treasuries returned more than 20%. What failed, though, was everything else that had sold as diversification: corporate bonds, mortgages, credit funds, alternatives. They fell together at the exact moment managers expected they would provide a cushion for stocks by not marching to the same drummer.

In 2022, the hedge itself failed. Pandemic supply shocks, stimulus spending and the energy spike after Russia invaded Ukraine drove inflation to a 40-year high of 9.1%. The Fed raised rates 425 basis points in nine months. (A basis point is one hundredth of a percentage point, so that’s a 4.25-point increase.) Few things are more challenging for a long bond than rising rates.

The standard 60/40 portfolio – for decades the default recipe in retirement planning – lost roughly 17.5% for the 2022 calendar year, as measured by Morgan Stanley Investment Management using a blend of 60% U.S. equities and 40% U.S. Treasury bonds. It was the worst year since 1937. And stocks weren’t doing the damage alone: long Treasuries fell harder that year than at any point in the recorded data.

Then came, as I mentioned, April 2025, when both equity and bond screens went red at once.

Each time the classic hedges failed, we were told it was an anomaly.

But three anomalies in 17 years starts to look less like bad luck, and more like a design flaw.

Porter Had Been Saying It Already

I reached that conclusion the expensive way, one drawdown at a time. Porter reached it years earlier, and he published his thoughts for the world to read.

He talked about the erosion of the dollar, and the dark and inevitable arithmetic of a government that has not stopped borrowing. He called it the bond trap: the “safe” asset had quietly become one of the riskiest things you could own. He’d been writing that years before the charts made it obvious.

That’s why, when Porter’s team called late last year about turning those ideas into an exchange-traded fund – an ETF – it was a quick and easy answer.

Why The Long Bond Breaks

So how does the asset that the industry treats as its safest… become one of its riskiest?

How the 30-year Treasury works: Hand the government $1,000 for 30 years. You get a fixed coupon (that’s the interest) every six months, and then you get your principal back 30 years later.

Two things decide what that promise is worth: What those dollars will buy in 2056, and what rate other buyers demand for the same promise in the meantime. Because if they demand a higher return, the bond that you own will be worth less.

So let’s look at the borrower. The United States government ran a federal deficit of roughly $1.8 trillion in its 2025 fiscal year – 5.9% of GDP, against a 50-year average of 3.8% – plus trillions more in unfunded Social Security and Medicare promises.

In my view, there is no politically viable tax increase, and no realistic spending cut, that could close a gap that size. Historically, gaps of this kind have often been narrowed by inflation.

In other words, dollars get created, each buys a little less, and the debt gets repaid in money worth a whole lot less in real terms than the money borrowed.

That isn’t a hedge. A hedge is supposed to pay when your stocks don’t. Inflation, though, takes both.

Underwriters, Not Treasuries

So if the long bond isn’t reliably the defensive part of a portfolio, what else might do that job?

Porter’s answer, and the part of his framework I had the hardest time arguing with, is to hand that job to property and casualty (P&C) insurance stocks. Those are the snoozefest (for anyone who’s not an investor, at least) companies that write your home and auto coverage, and pay out when a tree lands on a roof or you get in a fender bender.

A savvy insurer who knows how to price risk could be paid to hold its bonds. Premiums arrive today, claims are paid out years later – and the insurer can retain what it earns on the money in between. For example, Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway (BRK) ran roughly $176 billion of other people’s money that way in 2025.

Insurance companies also choose what to own and, for example, shorten maturities (to reduce volatility and downward price movement) when the rate environment is dangerous. A bond fund, though, holds whatever its index dictates, all the way down.

Of course, an insurance company that isn’t good at understanding the risks it’s taking on will wind up paying out more than it takes in, which doesn’t do investors any good. That’s why in the “bond” slice of the new fund I’ve created with Porter, we screen for underwriting quality before anything else.

How It Works Inside The Fund

PCPP is a passive fund. It seeks to track the investment results, before fees and expenses, of the Porter & Co. Porter Portfolio Index — a rules-based, multi-asset index. In the Porter & Company Porter Portfolio Index ETF (ticker symbol: PCPP), no holding is chosen by discretion on the day. The rules are written in advance.

A quarter of the portfolio goes to P&C insurance stocks, drawn from Porter & Co.’s analysis that’s screened for size, business mix, and historical return consistency. The top 20 that clear those bars go in, weighted so that historically stronger underwriters receive larger weights. No name accounts for more than 10%, and the index is rebuilt once a year.

Nobody gets to fall in love with a name. Porter & Co. builds the index. As the adviser, we can’t change it.

The other three sleeves of the fund operate the same way. You can read the full framework and the prospectus at porterandcofunds.com.

A Better Definition Of Safe?

In my opinion, “safe” doesn’t suggest an investment that doesn’t move.

The question worth asking is whether the thing you bought as a hedge behaves the way you expected – during a week that the equity side is down double digits, and you’re looking at two red screens.

By that definition, the long bond may have stopped being safe some time ago.

From what I’m seeing, most portfolios haven’t gotten the memo.

Matt Tuttle, CEO/CIO
Tuttle Capital Management

P.S. Every morning before the open, I publish The Daily HEAT, my framework applied to whatever the market is doing that day. It’s free. Sign up here.

Tell us what you think of today’s Daily Journal: porterstansberrydirect@gmail.com

Presented By: Brownstone Research

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Editor’s Note: Keep in mind, we only accept advertising from publishers we know to offer well-researched ideas vetted by a legal team, excellent customer service, and reasonable refund policies. Brownstone is one such partner. We do not, however, under any circumstances make any representations about their investment ideas or strategies, nor will we warrant them as equal to our own. We do recognize that the markets are tempestuous and, at times, ideas that we may not endorse prove valuable.


3 Things To Know Before We Go…

1. The riskiest junk bonds have stopped following the stock market. CCC-rated debt – the lowest tier of junk – is the corner of the bond market that normally tracks stocks most closely, moving about twice as much per point of S&P move as safer BB-rated paper. Since January, the extra yield investors demand to hold CCC debt instead of Treasuries has widened dramatically as the S&P 500 has continued to rise to new highs. The last time the two diverged like this preceded the 2022 bear market in stocks.

2. Axon lands three new deals in three new channels. In one week, Complete Investor recommendation Axon Enterprise (AXON) earned a 10-year, $40 million deal to put body cameras on every correctional officer in Maryland’s state prisons, then the Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”) announced that Axon will supply counter-drone sensors at U.S. airports, and the company also delivered an anti-drone system to Bulgaria – its first to a European military. Correctional facilities, federal civilian aviation, and European defense are all channels Axon didn’t serve two years ago. Shares are up 20% since our July 18 recommendation.

3. Broadcom adds to debt-fueled AI vendor financing woes. Custom chipmaker Broadcom (AVGO) announced yesterday talks with a group of lenders to raise up to $100 billion in debt for the purchase of its chips. The credit will be extended to Anthropic and other companies investing in AI computing power, with Broadcom potentially guaranteeing up to $70 billion of the debt, according to Bloomberg. The credit market reacted by sending Broadcom’s credit default swap – an insurance contract that pays out in the event of a default – to a new high of 80 basis points, up from just 10 basis points in June. The bond market is becoming increasingly concerned about the growing use of debt and circular financing arrangements fueling the AI boom.


Chart Of The Day… Franco-Nevada (FNV)

Franco-Nevada (FNV) has long been Porter’s favorite gold royalty company – the most capital efficient business model in the sector, with the best capital allocators – and since we originally added it as a Best Buy in late 2023, shares have gained 142%.

⚙ Edit 🗑 Delete

Every month we select three Porter & Co. recommendations that we think are at a particularly attractive buy price. Our next batch of Best Buys goes to paid-up subscribers tomorrow, August 22. To see what the team has selected, click here to learn more.


Mailbag

Yesterday, Porter defended his thesis that retailer Target is a fading business, despite the recent strong performance in TGT shares.

“Spot On”

Anne P. writes:

Porter your assessment regarding more affluent shoppers no longer being Target customers is spot on. The stores are no longer clean, the clerks know nothing, if you can find one. Merchandise quality has degraded while becoming aggressively political. The result of their choices of products, political statements, and employees has ruined their business.


“Woke”

James C. writes:

Porter, your in-depth analysis is impressive except for missing one element. That being the fallout of the store going in the extreme by bowing to the woke, thru endorsing and providing an abundance of gay community merchandise.

That offended and lost a customer base.


“Case Study In What Not To Do”

Marc Z. writes:

I have always considered Target’s business judgment as nonsensical. I used their foray into Canada in my business class as an object lesson in what not to do.


“Virtually Empty”

Michael H. writes:

I am a 27-year subscriber. This recent comment on Target is really interesting. In the last year, I have been inside Target stores in Phoenix, Arizona, Colorado Springs, Colorado, and Casper, Wyoming. To my surprise they have been virtually empty of customers. There are maybe 2-3-4 customers in the whole store. This really surprises me. And so yes, their foot traffic is woefully absent. And yes, as a customer I am wondering how they are staying open.

Thank you for your comments, and a very informative and interesting read.


“Surprised At Ernst & Young”

Tom W. writes:

I am a CPA and I am surprised that Ernst & Young signed-off on this accounting treatment!


Porter & Co. Market Snapshot

Price Yesterday’s Return Year-to-Date Return
S&P 500 Index $7,641.16 -0.86% 12.4%
Gold per ounce $4,516.58 0.02% 6.1%
Bitcoin $72,664 5.25% -12.1%
Oil (West Texas Intermediate) per barrel $86.83 2.88% 51.2%
Berkshire Hathaway (BRK) $744,600 -0.74% -1.4%
Porter’s Permanent Portfolio – 0.46% 4.0%
The Better Than Berkshire Index – -0.93% 10.6%
Total Return Annual Return
Porter & Co’s Top Ranked* 36.5% 16.9%
Yield Yesterday’s Change Change
Year-to-Date
U.S Treasury 30-Year Yield 5.24% 6 bps 40 bps
Prices as of 4:00 pm ET August 20, 2026 | bps = basis points (or 0.01%)
*A Complete Investor risk rating of 1 is defined as a “low risk, high allocation” security, while positions rated closer to a 5 are higher risk. Porter & Co.’s top-ranked positions include those rated either 1 or 2 in Complete Investor portfolio.


Porter & Co. Top Positions

Publication Ticker Description Total Return
Biotechnology QURE uniQure 237%
Biotechnology SGMT Sagimet Biosciences 189%
Complete Investor BWXT BWX Technologies 176%
Complete Investor BTC/USD Bitcoin 170%
Biotechnology NUVB Nuvation Bio 169%
Biotechnology ROIV Roivant Sciences 163%
Biotechnology TGTX TG Therapeutics 143%
Complete Investor PM Philip Morris 138%
Biotechnology QURE uniQure 131%
Complete Investor SKWD Skyward Specialty Insurance 127%
Prices as of 4:00 pm ET August 20, 2026


Please note: The investments in our “Porter & Co. Top Positions” should not be considered current recommendations. These positions are the best performers across our publications – and the securities listed may (or may not) be above the current buy-up-to price. To learn more, visit the current recommendations page of the relevant service, here| New Window. To gain access or to learn more about our current recommendations, call our Customer Care team at 888-610-8895 or internationally at +1 443-815-4447.

The post The Day “Safe” Stopped Feeling Safe appeared first on Porter & Co..

  • ✇Porter & Co
  • Trading Club Pro Update – Week Of August 17, 2026 Porter &#38 · Co.
    Editor’s note: For the month of August, we’re shifting the publication schedule for The Trading Club to bi-weekly updates. We will post our next update on September 4, after which we’ll return to our regular weekly publishing schedule. The value of The Trading Club Pro tracking portfolio settled at $114,290 as of Thursday, August 20 – up 14.3% since the June 22, 2026, inception date (see the detailed portfolio snapshot below). We made no trades this week. In this issue we provide an update on a
     

Trading Club Pro Update – Week Of August 17, 2026

21 August 2026 at 09:08

Editor’s note: For the month of August, we’re shifting the publication schedule for The Trading Club to bi-weekly updates. We will post our next update on September 4, after which we’ll return to our regular weekly publishing schedule.


The value of The Trading Club Pro tracking portfolio settled at $114,290 as of Thursday, August 20 – up 14.3% since the June 22, 2026, inception date (see the detailed portfolio snapshot below). We made no trades this week.

In this issue we provide an update on a covered-call position expiring today, review the latest earnings report from one of our software holdings, and address a recent subscriber question in the “Mailbag.”

Update On LandBridge Covered Call Expiring Today

The following covered-call contract on our 100-share position in West Texas land leasing company LandBridge (NYSE: LB) is set to expire at the close of trading today:

One LandBridge (NYSE: LB) $75 covered call, expiring August 21, 2026

No action is needed as we plan to continue holding the position through today’s expiration date.

With shares of LandBridge trading just under $90, the option is likely to expire in-the-money at the close of trading today. In this scenario, our shares will get called away, meaning our broker will automatically sell our 100-share position at the $75 strike price after the close of trading today.

Conversely, if shares fall below the $75 strike price by the close of trading today, the option will expire out-of-the-money and we will retain our 100-share position.

Either scenario is an acceptable outcome for us. Let’s briefly review the latest quarterly results and the valuation of the business that leads us to this conclusion.

LandBridge reported excellent Q2 results on August 5, including revenue of $67 million, up 41% year-on-year (“YOY”), while net income increased 68% YOY to $31 million. The company is benefitting from the resumption of drilling activity across the Permian basin, as the major drillers like ExxonMobil (XOM) and Chevron (CVX) add new drilling rigs in response to higher oil prices. And with oil production on the rise across the Permian, this is leading to greater volumes of produced water, translating into higher royalty payments for LandBridge.

Based on the steady growth in drilling activity, the company reiterated its 2026 outlook for EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization) to reach $220 million. It also announced advanced discussions with seven counterparties representing over 10 gigawatts of power and data center capacity for land leasing deals. LandBridge CFO Scott McNeely characterized these as projects with signed documents undergoing diligence or agreements currently under negotiation, rather than preliminary outreach. He also noted that the counterparties include a mix of hyperscalers, engineering, and procurement companies, as well as power generation businesses.

Management expects that “multiple” of these negotiations could convert into firm leases with revenue beginning to flow in by the end of next year, although no formal deals have yet been announced. But that hasn’t stopped the market from beginning to price in this potential future upside, as the shares have enjoyed a significant valuation re-rating in recent weeks.

At just under $90 per share, LandBridge trades with a $7.9 billion enterprise value (“EV”), putting its valuation at a relatively rich 36x EV/EBITDA ratio. That’s a 15% premium to Texas Pacific Land (TPL), currently trading at 31x EV/EBITDA, with both companies growing at similar rates.

While the business is performing well, we are ok with taking profits on the stock. At today’s stretched valuation, we believe investors are paying up for shares based on the promise of future data center deals that have yet to come to fruition. That presents a risk of a valuation de-rating in the event that these deals fail to materialize, or take longer to begin generating revenue than the market is currently pricing in. For now, we’ll continue monitoring the story and may re-enter the position should the opportunity present itself.

In the meantime, we plan on reinvesting a portion of the freed-up cash we expect to receive if the shares close above the covered-call option strike price today.

And for that, we turn to the latest opportunity provided by what we view as an over-reaction to a minor hiccup in the quarterly report from one of our favorite software stocks.

Cellebrite’s Minor Sales Hiccup Creates Buying Opportunity

Digital forensics platform Cellebrite (Nasdaq: CLBT) delivered modestly disappointing Q2 results on August 13. The company generated $131 million in Q2 revenue, or just shy of the $132 million analysts estimated, while earnings per share of $0.11 was in line with expectations. Management also reduced its forecasted revenue for the full year down by 3% to $555 (at the midpoint of the guidance range). However, despite the revenue downgrade, management increased its forecast for adjusted EBITDA up by 3% to $156 million for 2026.

The primary cause of the sales weakness was attributed to a slower pace of deal closing for the company’s cloud-based software offerings, which were stymied by unexpected regulatory steps. This resulted in a slightly elongated sales cycle, although no deals in the company’s sales pipeline were lost, as we’ll discuss in greater detail below.

In isolation, we viewed the revenue weakness in Q2 and downgrade in management’s outlook as modest disappointments. But the company also announced the unexpected retirement of CEO Tom Hogan, to be replaced by the former President of Products and Technology, Shiv Ramji, effective immediately.

While it’s never good to see an earnings miss followed by a guidance cut, it’s even worse when accompanied by a sudden shakeup in leadership. We suspect it was this confluence of negative bits of news that drove the stock down 30% following the report, with some investors likely viewing the sudden CEO change as evidence of deeper problems within the company. However, after looking closely through the numbers and the management commentary from the earnings call, we believe the share price sell off was an extreme over-reaction.

Let’s start by setting the stage for the regulatory obstacles the company is facing. As we’ve written about previously, in order to legally sell cloud-based software to any agency of the U.S. federal government, the vendor must first secure approval from the Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (“FedRAMP”).

Cellebrite secured FedRAMP approval on May 6, and management expected an immediate boost in sales from a healthy backlog of customer demand for its new cloud-based offerings starting in Q2. However, even after securing this approval, the company faced a new and evolving set of requirements that involved “multiple waivers, security reviews, and other other administrative approvals” in finalizing several of its large-scale cloud deals in Q2. CFO David Barter provided the following commentary on the earnings call that put the scope of these delayed deals into perspective:

When you put the quarter in context, we signed and took down orders probably well north of 1,000. In the end, it kind of came down to four, and it was four that crossed the line, and it was four that involved cloud. One in particular involved a platform. You might recall one of these deals we alluded to last time where they actually called us before we had FedRAMP approval. Even they were a little bit surprised about the changing procurement requirements when you get into cloud and AI and the approvals that we had to secure.

In other words, we’re talking about just four deals that contributed to the unexpected weakness in Q2. And importantly, none of these deals were lost, but merely delayed. Chief Revenue Officer Marcus Jewell noted on the call that $4 million worth of sales that were delayed in Q2 have since been closed as of the day of the conference call.

Now admittedly, a slower pace of deal closings will act as a modest drag on the rate of revenue growth over the next couple of quarters. However, the impact here should also be relatively muted over the long-run, with management estimating that the sales cycle was elongated by approximately six weeks for its cloud-based software sales.

Even with this slower sales cycle, the 3% decline in full year revenue for 2026 is far from a thesis-killer, with the company still on track to increase revenue by 17% this year at the midpoint of its updated guidance.

The bottom line is that we saw nothing in the report or in management commentary that should lead to any meaningful impairment to the long-term outlook for the business. Conversely, we saw signs of ongoing strength in the core business from the improving net revenue retention rate, which increased by two percentage points over Q1 to 117%. This tells us that the retention and expansion within the existing customer base actually improved sequentially, even as the growth rate from new sales slowed down from an elongated sales cycle.

We’ll also point out that there’s a flipside to the stringent regulatory requirements Cellebrite faces in selling cloud-based software to government agencies: it further widens the competitive moat around the business. Cellebrite is the only company among its peers that has achieved FedRAMP approval, which management described as a “long and tortuous process” on the Q2 earnings call. So as difficult as it is for the incumbent (Cellebrite) to navigate this complex regulatory environment, this also creates an incredibly high barrier to entry for smaller rivals that have fewer resources, and less of a track record in working with regulators, to overcome.

Meanwhile, the final thing we’ll point out is that ultimately its earnings and free cash flow (“FCF”) that determine the worth of a business, not the top-line revenue growth rate. And on this last point, we actually saw an improving outlook from the Q2 report, as management upped its earnings outlook by 3% for the full year while reiterating its 30% FCF margin target. This is a result of the company successfully scaling up the business while keeping its costs stable, including headcount – which remained unchanged through Q2 relative to the end of 2025, even as the business grows at mid-teens rates. Looking ahead, management noted that it is “increasingly optimistic about our potential to deliver the next step-up in our profitability and FCF in 2027 as we demonstrate that we can operate the business without material expansion of the headcount.”

Putting it all together, we see a business on track to increase revenue at a healthy mid-teens annual rate while generating approximately $167 million in FCF this year. At a recent price of around $11, the business trades at a market capitalization of $2.8 billion, with a pristine balance sheet that contains just over $500 million in net cash. That translates into an EV of $2.3 billion, and a valuation ratio of just under 14x EV-to-FCF compared with over 33x for the S&P 500.

Given Cellebrite’s dominant competitive position, wide structural moat, and high cash flow margins, we see no reason why this business should trade at a market discount. We suspect investors have grown frustrated with the shares after a year and a half of setbacks, starting with DOGE-related fears in early 2025, the perceived AI threat to all things software earlier this year, and now a guidance cut and CEO reshuffling. But simply looking at the objective business fundamentals, we see a deeply discounted stock where the underlying customer base remains sticky and a solid growth outlook.

Assuming the worst is behind it and the company achieves the latest guidance set out by management, we see no reason why the shares won’t compound in line with revenue growth going forward, at a high-teens rate. Plus, we also see significant upside potential from the valuation re-rating higher towards a market multiple, which would more than double the share price alone.

Our plan is to take advantage of this opportunity to increase our position in Cellebrite, using a portion of the freed-up cash from the LandBridge option expiration, assuming the option expires in-the-money at the close of trading today. That cash will be available for investment on Monday morning, at which point we’ll issue a new trade alert.

Next, we’ll show each position in the portfolio broken down by trade type.

Portfolio Review

The table below shows all current holdings as of the close of trading on Thursday, August 20:

A few notes on how to read and interpret this portfolio table.

Please pay special attention to the “Action” column, where we specify whether each trade is a “buy” or “sell to open” transaction.

Next, the position size for each trade is equal to the current value of the position, with the exception of the cash-secured puts. In the case of the cash-secured puts, we define the position size as the total value of our future commitment to purchase 100 shares for each contract. This number is calculated as follows:

Position size = number of contracts x 100 x put strike price

We use this number because it accurately reflects our total capital commitment, and thus our total risk exposure on the trade.

For example, in the case of the WaterBridge Infrastructure (NYSE: WBI) $30 puts, the position size equals 2 x 100 x $30 = $6,000. We use this number because it accurately reflects our total capital commitment, and thus our total risk exposure on the trade. It’s commonly referred to as the “notional value” of the trade.

To see the current profit/loss across each open position and other details, please see the live snapshot of our tracking portfolio at the end of this update.

We have compiled a summary overview of the latest quarterly trades released on June 22, which you can find here. Since then, we have recommended the additional trades listed below:

  1. On July 17, we recommended purchasing shares of Novo Nordisk (NYSE: NVO), which you can find here
  2. On July 21, we recommended purchasing shares of Hims & Hers Health (NYSE: HIMS), and we provided the analysis for the company on July 24, which you can find here

As a reminder, we calculate the leverage ratio using the following formula:

Leverage ratio = total long exposure/portfolio equity value

We define total long exposure as the sum of all long positions, including uncovered stocks, covered stocks, cash-secured puts, and option purchases. In the current portfolio, as of Wednesday’s close, these values were as follows (note: we show each value in our portfolio table below):

  • Uncovered stocks: $75,855
  • Covered stocks: $27,345 (netting out the underlying stock value against the covered-call value)
  • Put sales: $41,500 (this “notional value” is the value of stock we’ve committed to purchasing)
  • Long options positions: $942

Adding up all of these values gives us $145,642 of total long exposure in our current tracking portfolio. We then divide this number into our account equity of $114,290 to arrive at a 127% leverage ratio – well within our self-prescribed limit of 150%.

Next, we address a recent question from the “Mailbag”


Mailbag

Please note that nothing we write should ever be considered individual investment advice, as we are not licensed to provide such guidance. This material is for educational purposes only, and we recommend consulting with a licensed financial advisor for individual investment advice.

Today’s “Mailbag” letter comes from a subscriber with a question about our position in Celsius in the context of the recent sell recommendation of the stock in the Porter & Co. flagship advisory, Complete Investor.

I received the alert to sell Celsius Holdings (CELH) in Complete Investor, but there was no recommendation for the holdings in The Trading Club. Is Celsius still a recommended hold in The Trading Club, and if not, is the recommendation to close the options positions?

Ross Comment: Yes, we continue recommending holding the existing positions in Celsius Holdings (Nasdaq: CELH) in The Trading Club for the reasons described in our prior update on August 7.

With different analysts running the different publications at Porter & Co, we will sometimes have differing opinions on the same stocks. Plus, the option trading strategies in The Trading Club means we will sometimes have slightly different objectives versus a publication like Complete Investor that’s catered toward a buy-and-hold strategy.

For now, we’re happy to stick with our current strategy of selling options on Celsius, as we believe the downside risk is limited at current prices, while the elevated option premiums offer an attractive source of steady income potential.

If you have any questions or feedback, The Trading Club Forum is the best chance to get a quick response from our team.

Alternatively, you can always email us at mailbag@porterandcompanyresearch.com.

Good investing,

Ross Hendricks
Porter & Co.

The post Trading Club Pro Update – Week Of August 17, 2026 appeared first on Porter & Co..

  • ✇Porter & Co
  • Trading Club Update – Week Of August 17, 2026 Porter &#38 · Co.
    Editor’s note: For the month of August, we’re shifting the publication schedule for The Trading Club to bi-weekly updates. We will post our next update on September 4, after which we’ll return to our regular weekly publishing schedule. The value of The Trading Club tracking portfolio settled at $134,153 as of Thursday, August 20 – up 34.2% since the May 30, 2025, inception date (see the detailed portfolio snapshot below). We made no trades this week. In this issue we provide an update on a cove
     

Trading Club Update – Week Of August 17, 2026

21 August 2026 at 09:07

Editor’s note: For the month of August, we’re shifting the publication schedule for The Trading Club to bi-weekly updates. We will post our next update on September 4, after which we’ll return to our regular weekly publishing schedule.


The value of The Trading Club tracking portfolio settled at $134,153 as of Thursday, August 20 – up 34.2% since the May 30, 2025, inception date (see the detailed portfolio snapshot below). We made no trades this week.

In this issue we provide an update on a covered-call position expiring today, review the latest earnings report from one of our software holdings, and address a recent subscriber question in the “Mailbag.”

Update On LandBridge Covered Call Expiring Today

The following covered-call contract on our 100-share position in West Texas land leasing company LandBridge (NYSE: LB) is set to expire at the close of trading today:

One LandBridge (NYSE: LB) $75 covered call, expiring August 21, 2026

No action is needed as we plan to continue holding the position through today’s expiration date.

With shares of LandBridge trading just under $90, the option is likely to expire in-the-money at the close of trading today. In this scenario, our shares will get called away, meaning our broker will automatically sell our 100-share position at the $75 strike price after the close of trading today.

Conversely, if shares fall below the $75 strike price by the close of trading today, the option will expire out-of-the-money and we will retain our 100-share position.

Either scenario is an acceptable outcome for us. Let’s briefly review the latest quarterly results and the valuation of the business that leads us to this conclusion.

LandBridge reported excellent Q2 results on August 5, including revenue of $67 million, up 41% year-on-year (“YOY”), while net income increased 68% YOY to $31 million. The company is benefitting from the resumption of drilling activity across the Permian basin, as the major drillers like ExxonMobil (XOM) and Chevron (CVX) add new drilling rigs in response to higher oil prices. And with oil production on the rise across the Permian, this is leading to greater volumes of produced water, translating into higher royalty payments for LandBridge.

Based on the steady growth in drilling activity, the company reiterated its 2026 outlook for EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization) to reach $220 million. It also announced advanced discussions with seven counterparties representing over 10 gigawatts of power and data center capacity for land leasing deals. LandBridge CFO Scott McNeely characterized these as projects with signed documents undergoing diligence or agreements currently under negotiation, rather than preliminary outreach. He also noted that the counterparties include a mix of hyperscalers, engineering, and procurement companies, as well as power generation businesses.

Management expects that “multiple” of these negotiations could convert into firm leases with revenue beginning to flow in by the end of next year, although no formal deals have yet been announced. But that hasn’t stopped the market from beginning to price in this potential future upside, as the shares have enjoyed a significant valuation re-rating in recent weeks.

At just under $90 per share, LandBridge trades with a $7.9 billion enterprise value (“EV”), putting its valuation at a relatively rich 36x EV/EBITDA ratio. That’s a 15% premium to Texas Pacific Land (TPL), currently trading at 31x EV/EBITDA, with both companies growing at similar rates.

While the business is performing well, we are ok with taking profits on the stock. At today’s stretched valuation, we believe investors are paying up for shares based on the promise of future data center deals that have yet to come to fruition. That presents a risk of a valuation de-rating in the event that these deals fail to materialize, or take longer to begin generating revenue than the market is currently pricing in. For now, we’ll continue monitoring the story and may re-enter the position should the opportunity present itself.

In the meantime, we plan on reinvesting a portion of the freed-up cash we expect to receive if the shares close above the covered-call option strike price today.

And for that, we turn to the latest opportunity provided by what we view as an over-reaction to a minor hiccup in the quarterly report from one of our favorite software stocks.

Cellebrite’s Minor Sales Hiccup Creates Buying Opportunity

Digital forensics platform Cellebrite (Nasdaq: CLBT) delivered modestly disappointing Q2 results on August 13. The company generated $131 million in Q2 revenue, or just shy of the $132 million analysts estimated, while earnings per share of $0.11 was in line with expectations. Management also reduced its forecasted revenue for the full year down by 3% to $555 (at the midpoint of the guidance range). However, despite the revenue downgrade, management increased its forecast for adjusted EBITDA up by 3% to $156 million for 2026.

The primary cause of the sales weakness was attributed to a slower pace of deal closing for the company’s cloud-based software offerings, which were stymied by unexpected regulatory steps. This resulted in a slightly elongated sales cycle, although no deals in the company’s sales pipeline were lost, as we’ll discuss in greater detail below.

In isolation, we viewed the revenue weakness in Q2 and downgrade in management’s outlook as modest disappointments. But the company also announced the unexpected retirement of CEO Tom Hogan, to be replaced by the former President of Products and Technology, Shiv Ramji, effective immediately.

While it’s never good to see an earnings miss followed by a guidance cut, it’s even worse when accompanied by a sudden shakeup in leadership. We suspect it was this confluence of negative bits of news that drove the stock down 30% following the report, with some investors likely viewing the sudden CEO change as evidence of deeper problems within the company. However, after looking closely through the numbers and the management commentary from the earnings call, we believe the share price sell off was an extreme over-reaction.

Let’s start by setting the stage for the regulatory obstacles the company is facing. As we’ve written about previously, in order to legally sell cloud-based software to any agency of the U.S. federal government, the vendor must first secure approval from the Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (“FedRAMP”).

Cellebrite secured FedRAMP approval on May 6, and management expected an immediate boost in sales from a healthy backlog of customer demand for its new cloud-based offerings starting in Q2. However, even after securing this approval, the company faced a new and evolving set of requirements that involved “multiple waivers, security reviews, and other other administrative approvals” in finalizing several of its large-scale cloud deals in Q2. CFO David Barter provided the following commentary on the earnings call that put the scope of these delayed deals into perspective:

When you put the quarter in context, we signed and took down orders probably well north of 1,000. In the end, it kind of came down to four, and it was four that crossed the line, and it was four that involved cloud. One in particular involved a platform. You might recall one of these deals we alluded to last time where they actually called us before we had FedRAMP approval. Even they were a little bit surprised about the changing procurement requirements when you get into cloud and AI and the approvals that we had to secure.

In other words, we’re talking about just four deals that contributed to the unexpected weakness in Q2. And importantly, none of these deals were lost, but merely delayed. Chief Revenue Officer Marcus Jewell noted on the call that $4 million worth of sales that were delayed in Q2 have since been closed as of the day of the conference call.

Now admittedly, a slower pace of deal closings will act as a modest drag on the rate of revenue growth over the next couple of quarters. However, the impact here should also be relatively muted over the long-run, with management estimating that the sales cycle was elongated by approximately six weeks for its cloud-based software sales.

Even with this slower sales cycle, the 3% decline in full year revenue for 2026 is far from a thesis-killer, with the company still on track to increase revenue by 17% this year at the midpoint of its updated guidance.

The bottom line is that we saw nothing in the report or in management commentary that should lead to any meaningful impairment to the long-term outlook for the business. Conversely, we saw signs of ongoing strength in the core business from the improving net revenue retention rate, which increased by two percentage points over Q1 to 117%. This tells us that the retention and expansion within the existing customer base actually improved sequentially, even as the growth rate from new sales slowed down from an elongated sales cycle.

We’ll also point out that there’s a flipside to the stringent regulatory requirements Cellebrite faces in selling cloud-based software to government agencies: it further widens the competitive moat around the business. Cellebrite is the only company among its peers that has achieved FedRAMP approval, which management described as a “long and tortuous process” on the Q2 earnings call. So as difficult as it is for the incumbent (Cellebrite) to navigate this complex regulatory environment, this also creates an incredibly high barrier to entry for smaller rivals that have fewer resources, and less of a track record in working with regulators, to overcome.

Meanwhile, the final thing we’ll point out is that ultimately its earnings and free cash flow (“FCF”) that determine the worth of a business, not the top-line revenue growth rate. And on this last point, we actually saw an improving outlook from the Q2 report, as management upped its earnings outlook by 3% for the full year while reiterating its 30% FCF margin target. This is a result of the company successfully scaling up the business while keeping its costs stable, including headcount – which remained unchanged through Q2 relative to the end of 2025, even as the business grows at mid-teens rates. Looking ahead, management noted that it is “increasingly optimistic about our potential to deliver the next step-up in our profitability and FCF in 2027 as we demonstrate that we can operate the business without material expansion of the headcount.”

Putting it all together, we see a business on track to increase revenue at a healthy mid-teens annual rate while generating approximately $167 million in FCF this year. At a recent price of around $11, the business trades at a market capitalization of $2.8 billion, with a pristine balance sheet that contains just over $500 million in net cash. That translates into an EV of $2.3 billion, and a valuation ratio of just under 14x EV-to-FCF compared with over 33x for the S&P 500.

Given Cellebrite’s dominant competitive position, wide structural moat, and high cash flow margins, we see no reason why this business should trade at a market discount. We suspect investors have grown frustrated with the shares after a year and a half of setbacks, starting with DOGE-related fears in early 2025, the perceived AI threat to all things software earlier this year, and now a guidance cut and CEO reshuffling. But simply looking at the objective business fundamentals, we see a deeply discounted stock where the underlying customer base remains sticky and a solid growth outlook.

Assuming the worst is behind it and the company achieves the latest guidance set out by management, we see no reason why the shares won’t compound in line with revenue growth going forward, at a high-teens rate. Plus, we also see significant upside potential from the valuation re-rating higher towards a market multiple, which would more than double the share price alone.

Our plan is to take advantage of this opportunity to increase our position in Cellebrite, using a portion of the freed-up cash from the LandBridge option expiration, assuming the option expires in-the-money at the close of trading today. That cash will be available for investment on Monday morning, at which point we’ll issue a new trade alert.

Next, we’ll show each position in the portfolio broken down by trade type.

Portfolio Review

The table below shows all current holdings as of the close of trading on Thursday, August 20:

A few notes on how to read and interpret this portfolio table.

Please pay special attention to the “Action” column, where we specify whether each trade is a “buy” or “sell to open” transaction.

Next, the position size for each trade is equal to the current value of the position, with the exception of the cash-secured puts. In the case of the cash-secured puts, we define the position size as the total value of our future commitment to purchase 100 shares for each contract. This number is calculated as follows:

Position size = number of contracts x 100 x put strike price

We use this number because it accurately reflects our total capital commitment, and thus our total risk exposure on the trade.

For example, in the case of the Celsius Holdings (Nasdaq: CELH) $30 puts, the position size equals 2 x 100 x $30 = $6,000. We use this number because it accurately reflects our total capital commitment, and thus our total risk exposure on the trade.

To see the current profit/loss across each open position and other details, please see the live snapshot of our tracking portfolio at the end of this update.

We have compiled a summary overview of the latest quarterly trades released on June 22, which you can find here. Since then, we have recommended the additional trades listed below:

  1. On July 17, we recommended purchasing shares of Novo Nordisk (NYSE: NVO), which you can find here
  2. On July 21, we recommended purchasing shares of Hims & Hers Health (NYSE: HIMS), and we provided the analysis for the company on July 24, which you can find here

Next, we address a recent question from the “Mailbag”


Mailbag

Please note that nothing we write should ever be considered individual investment advice, as we are not licensed to provide such guidance. This material is for educational purposes only, and we recommend consulting with a licensed financial advisor for individual investment advice.

Today’s “Mailbag” letter comes from a subscriber with a question about our position in Celsius in the context of the recent sell recommendation of the stock in the Porter & Co. flagship advisory, Complete Investor.

I received the alert to sell Celsius Holdings (CELH) in Complete Investor, but there was no recommendation for the holdings in The Trading Club. Is Celsius still a recommended hold in The Trading Club, and if not, is the recommendation to close the options positions?

Ross Comment: Yes, we continue recommending holding the existing positions in Celsius Holdings (Nasdaq: CELH) in The Trading Club for the reasons described in our prior update on August 7.

With different analysts running the different publications at Porter & Co, we will sometimes have differing opinions on the same stocks. Plus, the option trading strategies in The Trading Club means we will sometimes have slightly different objectives versus a publication like Complete Investor that’s catered toward a buy-and-hold strategy.

For now, we’re happy to stick with our current strategy of selling options on Celsius, as we believe the downside risk is limited at current prices, while the elevated option premiums offer an attractive source of steady income potential.

If you have any questions or feedback, The Trading Club Forum is the best chance to get a quick response from our team.

Alternatively, you can always email us at mailbag@porterandcompanyresearch.com.

Good investing,

Ross Hendricks
Porter & Co.


The post Trading Club Update – Week Of August 17, 2026 appeared first on Porter & Co..

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  • Target’s Tariff Refund Isn’t A Turnaround Porter &#38 · Co.
    Issue#144, Volume#3 Edit Delete Edit Delete How The Retailer Lost The Customer Who Made It Profitable Inside Today’s Issue Essay: Target’s Tariff Refund Isn’t A Turnaround Evaporating Dividend Yields Down Days For Walmart How Bessent Played With Bond Yields Chart Of The Day… Veeva Systems (VEEV) Today’s Mailbag Last September, I explained why I think Target (TGT) will end up in bankruptcy within five to seven years. Since then the stock is up 85% – which in the minds of most reade
     

Target’s Tariff Refund Isn’t A Turnaround

20 August 2026 at 13:02

Issue#144, Volume#3

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How The Retailer Lost The Customer Who Made It Profitable


Last September, I explained why I think Target (TGT) will end up in bankruptcy within five to seven years. Since then the stock is up 85% – which in the minds of most readers will surely lead to the conclusion that I am wrong. But am I?

Here’s my thesis.

Target was the premier retail shopping experience for roughly two decades. The “Target run” was a weekend habit for many middle-class and upper-middle-class consumers. Target combined outstanding retailing with competitive prices, which won it a higher operating margin than other retailers. Those profits powered its constant expansion and brand marketing, which created a valuable national brand. For a very long time, this was more than good enough to hold off competitive threats from Costco Wholesale (COST), Walmart (WMT), and Amazon (AMZN). But, at the heart of Target’s success was an elevated, in-person shopping experience.

Then COVID happened.

Consumers’ shopping habits changed… dramatically. Upper-middle-class customers stopped coming to the store, at first because of masks and now because delivery apps save so much time. Additionally, in many areas, Target’s stores became rundown and filled with both low-class employees and low-class customers. As traffic fell, margins collapsed.

The shopping app trend continues: DoorDash grew revenue 35.6% in its June quarter, to $4.45 billion from $3.28 billion. Instacart grew 14.1%, to $1.04 billion from $914 million. The affluent household now pays a fee to avoid going to Target.

Target lost the customer who made it profitable.

Key stats from Target’s fiscal 2021 peak to its lows in fiscal 2025:

  • Revenue: $106.0 billion to $104.8 billion, down 1.2% in nominal dollars across four years of inflation
  • Operating income: $8.95 billion to $5.12 billion, down 42.8%
  • Operating margin: 8.4% to 4.9%
  • Diluted earnings per share: $14.10 to $8.13, down 42.3%
  • Free cash flow after capital spending: $5.08 billion to $2.83 billion

The company’s product mix also demonstrates this key demographic shift in its customer base. Since 2022 (full fiscal year 2022 vs fiscal year 2026):

  • Home furnishing and décor: $20.3 billion to $15.6 billion, down 22.9%
  • Hardlines: $18.6 billion to $15.8 billion, down 15.1%
  • Apparel and accessories: $17.9 billion to $15.7 billion, down 12.2%
  • Food and beverage: $20.3 billion to $24.1 billion, up 18.9%

Target replaced its highest-margin customers with people looking for cheap groceries.

But that’s not what today’s headlines claim. The company reports that operating margins have soared – jumping from 5.2% to 9.6% in the latest quarter.

When I saw those headlines, I laughed. There’s no way to increase operating margins when you’re in the middle of a turnaround that requires you to vastly improve the shopping experience while lowering prices. Target is spending heavily to improve its stores and it’s lowering its prices. How could margins improve?

Target received $994 million of refunds on tariffs last quarter. Getting a billion dollars certainly helps! The company chose to book this income as a reduction of cost of sales. Cost of goods sold therefore fell 1.7% while sales rose 5.3%, in part because of inflation.

The increase in operating margins was not brilliant merchandising. It was a one-time windfall and an accountant with a valuable imagination.

Target’s headline result was: 33.7% gross margin, up from 29.0% a year ago; a 9.6% operating margin against last year’s 5.2%.

What were the numbers, absent the one-time windfall?

Let me show you the 2Q results from 2024 and 2025. (Fiscal 2025’s Q2 was the liquidation quarter, when Target cleared excess inventory and cancelled orders. It’s not indicative of the company’s normal business. Fiscal 2024’s Q2 is the last one that ran normally.)

Target has a new chief executive, an “acceleration office,” 30 new stores, 130 remodels, and price cuts on more than 10,000 items. What’s changed? After two years, costs continue to grow – Selling, General, And Administrative (“SG&A”) is now 21.6% of revenue – and profits continue to fall – operating margin is 5.9% down from 6.4%, net income is $1.12 billion down from $1.19 billion.

Target went from 1,926 stores and 243.3 million square feet to 1,995 stores and 250.5 million square feet, while merchandise sales per square foot fell from $430 to $410, down 4.6% before inflation – 69 additional stores produced less sales per foot.

Another sign of brand decline: credit card profit sharing, the fee Target collects on its co-branded card, fell from $710 million to $522 million. Fewer affluent cardholders spending on credit.

Target has seen a 3.6% traffic increase. Two quarters of rising traffic is evidence that something is changing. The numbers tell me it’s more people responding to Target’s discounting because gross margin and operating margin continue to decline (compared to a real baseline, not a liquidation quarter).

Target is buying traffic with lower prices. It has reduced prices on more than 10,000 items in the last year. Average transaction price was flat this quarter and fell 0.4% for the full fiscal year, despite inflation above 3%.

Target is completing its conversion into a discount chain — more customers, cheaper carts, thinner margins, and a store experience that pushes the remaining affluent shopper toward an app.

Competing on price means competing with Walmart, which has far greater scale, and Costco, which competes with less markup, and Dollar General, which has lower cost per square foot.

Target carries the cost structure of a lifestyle retailer and the assortment of a discounter. That’s the Kmart strategy. And it doesn’t work.

There’s one wildcard that could enable Target to continue to tread water for longer than I expect.

Target sells advertising (Roundel) to its vendors. The incremental cost of those advertising dollars is close to zero. It also has Target Plus – a third-party marketplace where Target books a commission. And Circle 360 is the paid membership program at Target. Management reported Roundel gross billings were up nearly 20%, Target Plus merchandise volume was up more than 40%, and Circle 360 membership revenue up over 40%.

Target discloses advertising revenue in its annual filings:

  • Fiscal 2023: $404 million
  • Fiscal 2025: $649 million
  • Fiscal 2026: $915 million

These are impressive numbers. But advertising is only 0.87% of total revenue.

To add one percentage point of operating margin, Target needs $1.05 billion of incremental operating profit. Advertising would have to more than double, at zero incremental cost, to recover a single point of the three and a half points of operating margin lost since fiscal 2021.

It’s a very important part of its business and it’s something that Kmart didn’t have. Is it enough to save the business? I don’t think so.

Capital spending is up 30% this year to $5 billion for the year. Target continues to invest heavily into its core retail business even though it continues to report falling sales per square foot. Shareholders are funding a bet that remodeled stores attract a customer who has already installed a shopping app and won’t go Target again. That strategy isn’t working: Target has added 69 stores over the last four years. And sales per square foot continue to fall.

Frankly, I think these decisions and the management’s handling of the tariff refund accounting show they’re delusional. But if you doubt me, just consider that they are also saying Target will resume repurchasing its own shares in the back half of this year.

Operating cash flow over the last 12 months was $8.72 billion. Remove the $994 million refund and it is $7.73 billion. Spend the promised $5 billion of capital and pay the $2.07 billion dividend, and $661 million remains for the entire year.

What Target must do is rebuild its brand, its merchandising, and its shopping experience to recapture its core, high-margin user. So far it hasn’t found that formula. And with so much competition from Costco, Amazon, Walmart, and Dollar General I don’t believe that’s possible.

Tell me what you think of today’s Daily Journal: porterstansberrydirect@gmail.com

Good investing,

F. Porter Stansberry
Stevenson, Maryland

P.S. For 50 years, market predictions offered up at The New Orleans Investment Conference have become market reality. This year, Porter has been invited to address the prestigious event, taking place October 28 to October 31. To learn more about the legendary conference and to attend, follow this link…

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Presented By: MyWallSt


3 Things To Know Before We Go…

1. Stock dividends can no longer compete with Treasury bonds. In July 2016, 63.4% of S&P 500 companies paid a dividend yield above the 10-year Treasury note – meaning a shareholder collected more annual income per dollar invested than a government bond paid. That was the highest level since the data began in 1972, excluding the brief COVID crash. A decade later, that figure is 3.85%, the lowest since May 2007 – just 19 companies out of 500. Both sides of the comparison moved: the 10-year yield finished July at 4.75% versus 1.46% 10 years earlier, while the S&P 500’s own dividend yield was cut roughly in half, to about 1%, as index weight shifted toward technology companies that return cash through buybacks (or not at all).

2. Walmart earnings signal more consumer stress. Walmart (WMT) reported its weakest same-store-sales growth since 2020 in its Q2 results this morning, at 2.6%, significantly undershooting the 3.7% analyst estimates, sending shares 10% lower. Management cited stretched consumer budgets as the cause of sluggish demand, and this comes after U.S. retail sales unexpectedly dropped 0.6% in July. It also follows the poor July payrolls report that showed U.S. jobs declining by 23,000 for the month. The signs of a widespread consumer slowdown are mounting.

3. The Treasury’s bond-market rescue has already faded. At 8:20 am ET Wednesday, the 10-year Treasury yield was 4.68%. Minutes later, the U.S. Treasury announced it would at least double its “liquidity support” buybacks in the 10-to-30-year part of the market – from $2 billion per operation to at least $4 billion – starting September 9. The 10-year fell to 4.64%, and the 30-year dropped nine basis points to 5.19%, a day after touching its highest level since 2007. By this morning, the 10-year was at 4.71%, above where it started, and the 30-year yield had erased its entire decline. The arithmetic explains why. A buyback creates no new money: Treasury repurchases older bonds using cash raised by selling new debt, mostly short-term bills. It swaps maturities, it doesn’t retire debt. Total buybacks this quarter are capped near $38 billion versus $739 billion of net new borrowing. Markets read the move as a step toward holding long-term rates down. But for now, at least, the size isn’t there.


Chart Of The Day… Veeva Systems (VEEV)

Biotech software leader Veeva Systems (VEEV) has seen its share price rise 24% since Porter recommended the company in the newly revamped Porter & Co. Biotechnology on August 1. His next biotech report reaches paid-up subscribers on September 5.


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To become a paid-up subscriber and see what Porter will recommend next, click here.


Mailbag

“Same Thing As QE”

David G. writes:

Hey Porter,

Another great essay.

I read in the news this morning that the U.S. Treasury has begun buying back 10-year bonds to keep the interest on the 10-year bond down. It was 4.7% yesterday. That’s pretty close to your 5% “get out now” warning.

Isn’t this the same thing as QE for the long side of bonds?

In my honest opinion, I’m not sure that Secretary Bessent is really doing this solely for the interest rate. I personally think that he saw the handwriting on the wall similar to March 2023 when Signature and Silicon Valley collapsed. Liquidity then, and now, has all dried up.


“Stupid, Paper-Shuffling Rules”

Kraig F. writes:

Government regulators and stupidity certainly do rhyme. Why eliminate some of the rules passed under Dodd-Frank? It had many stupid, paper-shuffling rules (real estate appraisals come to mind), but the ones you mentioned are generally good guardrails.

As you point out, it will create winners and losers. I have been thinking of shorting Oracle for a while.

Your simple-to-understand analysis is much appreciated.


Porter & Co. Market Snapshot

Price Yesterday’s Return Year-to-Date Return
S&P 500 Index $7,707.98 0.22% 13.4%
Gold per ounce $4,515.58 4.18% 3.3%
Bitcoin $69,041 6.95% -18.1%
Oil (West Texas Intermediate) per barrel $85.83 0.48% 55.0%
Berkshire Hathaway (BRK) $750,170.00 -0.46% -0.6%
Porter’s Permanent Portfolio – 1.34% 3.5%
The Better Than Berkshire Index – 1.01% 11.6%
Total Return Annual Return
Porter & Co’s Top Ranked* 36.2% 16.8%
Yield Yesterday’s Change Change
Year-to-Date
U.S Treasury 30-Year Yield 5.19% -9 bps 35 bps
Prices as of 4:00 pm ET August 19, 2026 | bps = basis points (or 0.01%)
*A Complete Investor risk rating of 1 is defined as a “low risk, high allocation” security, while positions rated closer to a 5 are higher risk. Porter & Co.’s top-ranked positions include those rated either 1 or 2 in Complete Investor portfolio.


Porter & Co. Top Positions

Publication Ticker Description Total Return
Biotechnology QURE uniQure 237%
Biotechnology SGMT Sagimet Biosciences 197%
Complete Investor BWXT BWX Technologies 186%
Biotechnology NUVB Nuvation Bio 186%
Biotechnology ROIV Roivant Sciences 165%
Complete Investor BTC/USD Bitcoin 157%
Biotechnology TGTX TG Therapeutics 146%
Complete Investor PM Philip Morris 136%
Biotechnology SGMT Sagimet Biosciences 131%
Complete Investor SKWD Skyward Specialty Insurance 129%
Prices as of 4:00 pm ET August 19, 2026


Please note: The investments in our “Porter & Co. Top Positions” should not be considered current recommendations. These positions are the best performers across our publications – and the securities listed may (or may not) be above the current buy-up-to price. To learn more, visit the current recommendations page of the relevant service, here| New Window. To gain access or to learn more about our current recommendations, call our Customer Care team at 888-610-8895 or internationally at +1 443-815-4447.

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